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491 
RETHINKING THE COSTS  
OF INTERNATIONAL DELEGATIONS 
DANIEL ABEBE* 
ABSTRACT 
 
A prominent criticism of United States delegations to international 
institutions—or international delegations—focuses on agency costs.  The 
criticism draws a stark contrast between international delegations and 
domestic delegations.  For domestic delegations to agencies, U.S. 
congressional, executive, and judicial oversight mechanisms exist to try to 
ensure agency accountability.  Since the agency is democratically 
accountable, agency costs are low.  For international delegations of 
binding authority to international institutions, however, the conventional 
wisdom is that oversight mechanisms are absent and the United States 
cannot monitor the international institution to ensure it acts within its 
delegated authority.  Therefore, in the international context, agency costs 
are high.  The fear of high agency costs through the loss of democratic 
accountability, so the argument goes, justifies constitutionally inspired 
limits on international delegations.  This Article challenges the 
conventional wisdom.  It argues that the claim of high agency costs rests 
on weak foundations because agency costs will likely vary depending on 
the type, scope, and nature of the delegation; that the United States has 
actually implemented many of the domestic oversight tools in the 
international context, ensuring a surprisingly high level of accountability 
to American interests; and that the potential costs and benefits of 
international delegations may not be substantially different from those in 
domestic delegations.  In other words, it is unlikely that there are 
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dramatic differences between domestic and international delegations with 
respect to the efficacy of oversight mechanisms or the balance of costs and 
benefits.  This Article concludes that constitutionally-inspired limits on 
binding international delegations are probably unnecessary because they 
will increase the costs for the United States to participate in potentially 
beneficial international cooperation. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Which is worse: a delegation to an unaccountable federal 
agency or a delegation to an unaccountable international 
institution?  The answer is not as clear as it might seem.  Today, 
Congress and the President delegate effective decision-making 
authority to federal entities and to international institutions.  
Although most accept domestic delegations to federal entities as 
part of the modern administrative state, some fear the prospect of 
international delegations to distant, unaccountable, and 
supposedly anti-American international institutions, and propose 
strict limits on them.  They claim that international delegations 
pose a distinctive democratic accountability dilemma that domestic 
delegations do not.  To frame the problem, consider two stylized 
examples. 
Example One.  Congress and the President have long delegated 
authority to the Federal Reserve, a domestic entity, to manage the 
U.S. financial system.  In 2010, in response to the financial crisis, 
Congress and the President empowered the Federal Reserve to 
develop new regulations for banks.  The Federal Reserve, through 
its Board of Governors, has since issued some forty-seven 
regulatory measures with neither open meetings nor public 
discussion of its rule-making.  Congress and the President cannot 
monitor the Board of Governors’ activities, participate in the 
debate, or block any rule inconsistent with their interests. 
Example Two.  Congress and the President have long delegated 
authority to the United Nations (“U.N.”), an international 
institution, to maintain international peace and security.  In 2011, 
in response to the Libyan uprising, Congress and the President 
sought to use the U.N. as a tool to implement a plan of military 
action against the Muammar Gaddafi regime.  Acting through the 
Security Council, the United States sponsored and obtained 
successful passage of a resolution after holding open meetings and 
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debate.  At the same time, a non-permanent member of the 
Security Council introduced a resolution condemning the actions 
of a U.S. ally in the Middle East.  Since the United States is a 
permanent member of the Security Council and holds a veto, the 
executive branch was able to monitor this effort and eventually 
block the proposed resolution that was inconsistent with American 
interests. 
Based upon these two examples, it is unclear which species of 
delegation, domestic or international, creates greater democratic 
accountability problems for Congress and the President.  In light of 
this, it is worth considering carefully whether delegations of 
authority to international institutions such as the United Nations 
indeed create what are called greater “agency costs” than domestic 
delegations of authority to bodies such as the Federal Reserve.  The 
conventional wisdom, which is critical of international delegations, 
mistakenly suggests the answer is obvious: international 
delegations almost always create significantly higher agency costs 
than domestic delegations.  For domestic delegations, U.S. 
congressional, executive and judicial oversight mechanisms are 
present to monitor the agency to try to ensure accountability and 
democratic legitimacy.  Here, agency costs are low.  But for 
international delegations of binding authority to international 
institutions, critics contend U.S. oversight mechanisms are absent, 
leaving the United States unable to ensure that the international 
institution will act within the bounds of its delegated authority.  
Moreover, international institutions are neither representative of 
U.S. interests nor accountable to the American public.  Therefore, 
agency costs are high for international delegations, and binding 
international delegations should be either disfavored or avoided.1 
How would critics address this apparent problem?  Most want 
to limit, but not entirely oust, international delegations.  Some 
suggest that U.S. courts should adopt “super-strong” clear 
                                                     
1 See, e.g., John C. Yoo, Globalism and the Constitution: Treaties, Non-Self-
Execution, and the Original Understanding, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1955 (1999); Julian G. 
Ku, The Delegation of Federal Power to International Organizations: New Problems with 
Old Solutions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 71 (2000); Ernest A. Young, The Trouble with Global 
Constitutionalism, 38 TEX. INT’L L.J. 527 (2003); Edward T. Swaine, The 
Constitutionality of International Delegations, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1492, 1540 (2004); 
John O. McGinnis, Medellín and the Future of International Delegations, 118 YALE L.J. 
1712 (2009). 
02_ABEBE (DO NOT DELETE) 8/6/2013  7:53 PM 
494 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 34:3 
 
statement rules or non-self-execution default rules when 
considering whether the United States has made a binding 
international delegation.  Others suggest that the United States 
should require that all binding international delegations go 
through the Article II treaty process, making them much harder to 
enact.  In the end, the specter of high agency costs, so the argument 
goes, justifies modification to constitutional processes in ways that 
impose limits on international delegations. 
To examine the merits of the agency costs claim, this Article 
focuses on two important questions: First, are the oversight tools 
used to manage international delegations and domestic delegations 
systematically different in efficacy?  Second, is the balance of costs 
and benefits for international delegations systematically different 
from that of domestic delegations?  For the reasons outlined below, 
I argue that the answer to both questions is likely no. 
I challenge the key claim that international delegations create 
high agency costs because domestic oversight mechanisms are 
unavailable in the international context.  To the contrary, many of 
the oversight mechanisms common to domestic delegations are 
already present, in different forms, for international delegations.  
The economic, political, and military power of the United States 
makes it uniquely well placed to influence ex ante the design and 
structure of the international institutions to which it might choose 
to delegate binding authority, and shape ex post the product of 
those international institutions.  Because of this influence, the 
United States can replicate some of the domestic oversight tools—
procedural constraints, appropriations, and agenda setting, for 
example—in the international context as well.  Indeed, the United 
States has a number of tools unique to the international 
environment, ranging from side-payments and foreign aid, to 
weighted voting and veto powers, to try to align the international 
institutions with U.S. interests.  From this perspective, 
international delegations and domestic delegations are not 
categorically distinct on any democratic accountability or agency 
cost metric; oversight mechanisms exist in both contexts to reduce 
agency costs. 
I contend that the critics are wrong to conclude that the balance 
of costs and benefits from international delegations is 
systematically different from the balance in the domestic 
delegation context.  An initial problem is that it is unclear how 
critics define agency costs, measure them, and determine when 
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agency costs are high enough to justify limits on international 
delegations.  Agency costs, moreover, will likely vary depending 
on the type of delegation, the scope of the delegation, the issue 
area, and the frequency with which the international institution is 
likely to exercise delegated authority, among other factors.2  Any 
strong claim about the level of agency costs must, at the very least, 
provide a more nuanced analysis of the interactions between the 
United States and international institutions.  In addition, critics do 
not specify how high agency costs must be to warrant 
constitutional redress.  If agency costs are lower than they 
assume—the claim is underspecified—then making international 
delegations more difficult to enact may very well be a solution in 
search of a problem.  Agency costs are problematic if they 
outweigh the potential benefits from binding international 
delegations.  The mere existence of agency costs, without greater 
specification, seems insufficient to warrant specific changes in the 
constitutional process solely to limit international delegations. 
In fact, the President and Congress are already fully 
incentivized to consider carefully the wisdom of binding 
international delegations and will likely take steps to ensure 
accountability and reduce agency costs without any modification 
of constitutional process.  This caution is reflected in the pattern of 
U.S. design, control, and influence over international institutions 
for non-binding international delegations and, given the United 
States’ incentives to protect the American political processes, it is 
even more likely that this pattern will continue for binding 
international delegations.  Since the United States would only 
delegate binding authority in the vast majority of cases to an 
international institution that it could influence, additional 
constitutionally inspired limits would be superfluous. 
In the end, proposals to raise the enactment costs of all binding 
delegations create a crude rule of national constitutional design 
that will likely limit the ability of Congress and the President to 
conduct foreign affairs.  A careful analysis of the costs and benefits 
                                                     
2 See Curtis A. Bradley & Judith G. Kelley, The Concept of International 
Delegation, 71 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 1 (2008) (describing the various types of 
international delegations); Andrew T. Guzman & Jennifer Landsidle, The Myth of 
International Delegation, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 1693 (2008) (questioning the proper 
definition of international delegations and exploring the instances in which the 
United States delegates authority). 
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of binding international delegation will depend on international 
political considerations properly within the national government’s 
foreign affairs prerogatives.  Since international delegations are 
given effect by treaty or statute, Congress and the President clearly 
participate in the enactment process, ameliorating some of the 
accountability and legitimacy concerns.  And of course, if a later 
Congress and President conclude that a specific international 
delegation is problematic, they can abrogate the delegation 
through subsequent legislation without triggering offsetting 
democratic costs. 
This discussion suggests that agency costs in international 
delegations might not systematically be higher or categorically 
distinct from those in domestic delegations.  The United States has 
tools to reduce agency costs in both contexts.  If so, the adoption of 
constitutionally inspired design rules to raise the enactment costs 
of all binding international delegations is unnecessary and 
probably counterproductive, as such rules will limit the national 
government’s flexibility to participate in and delegate to 
international institutions that might create benefits for the United 
States. 
The Article proceeds as follows.  Section 2 describes domestic 
and international delegations to set the framework for analysis.  
Section 3 evaluates the problems with international delegations 
and the proposals to raise the enactment costs of international 
delegations.  Section 4 argues that many of the domestic oversight 
tools are available in the international context and that the United 
States is particularly well situated to influence the international 
institutions exercising delegated authority.  The Article concludes 
with a discussion of the possible benefits of binding international 
delegations and suggests that constitutional limitations on 
international delegations are unnecessary. 
2. DELEGATIONS: DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL 
2.1. Domestic Delegations 
The regulatory structure governing domestic delegations to 
administrative agencies provides the framework through which 
scholars generally evaluate international delegations.  Although 
the administrative law literature on domestic delegations is 
enormous and a review is beyond the scope of this Article, it is 
important to sketch an outline of it to compare to international 
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delegations.  The comparison will shed light on the type of 
problems common to domestic delegations and on the attempts to 
address them, and will provide background on the critiques for 
binding delegations as well. 
In the United States, domestic delegations were tools borne out 
of the increasingly complex and technical regulatory apparatus of 
the modern administrative state.3  Congress, lacking the necessary 
expertise and resources to address new regulatory demands, began 
to delegate broad authority to executive agencies for them to issue 
rules, directives, and regulations in their specified issue areas.4  
The benefit is twofold: Congress can take advantage of agency 
expertise, in theory producing socially desirable outcomes, and 
Congress can focus its resources on issues for which it is better-
suited to legislate.5 
Despite the potential benefits, delegations create a principal-
agent problem6—namely that Congress and the President7 cannot 
                                                     
3 This development, combined with the Supreme Court’s loosening of the 
non-delegation doctrine, opened the door to the expansion of domestic 
delegations.  See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL 
REVIEW 132–33 (1980) (concluding the non-delegation doctrine is dead); see also 
Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315 (2000) (arguing that 
although the non-delegation doctrine is no longer recognized, different canons of 
construction operate as a type of non-delegation principle to oversee the 
administrative state); Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Interring the 
Nondelegation Doctrine, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1721 (2002) (arguing there is no non-
delegation doctrine as typically described and that agents acting under a statutory 
grant are exercising executive, not legislative, power). 
4 See DAVID EPSTEIN & SHARYN O’HALLORAN, DELEGATING POWERS: A 
TRANSACTION COST POLITICS APPROACH TO POLICY MAKING UNDER SEPARATE 
POWERS (1999). 
5 See generally JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 23, 142 (1938); 
CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING THE REGULATORY 
STATE 23 (1990); James O. Freedman, Expertise and the Administrative Process, 28 
ADMIN. L. REV. 363, 363–66 (1976); see also ALFRED C. AMAN, JR. & WILLIAM T. 
MAYTON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 10–12 (1993) (noting the conservation of 
congressional resources as a benefit of delegation). 
6 Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R. Weingast, Administrative 
Procedures as Instruments of Political Control, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 243, 247 (“The 
problem of bureaucratic compliance has long been recognized as a principal-agent 
problem.  Specifically, members of Congress and the president are principals in an 
agency relationship with an executive bureau.”).  For further background on the 
principal-agent problem, see generally Terry M. Moe, The New Economics of 
Organization, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 739 (1984); Barry R. Weingast, The Congressional-
Bureaucratic System: A Principal Agent Perspective (with Applications to the SEC), 44 
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perfectly control their agent, the domestic agencies exercising 
delegated authority.  After the delegation, neither Congress nor the 
President can ensure that the agencies would consistently act 
within the bounds of their delegated authority.  The agent might 
deviate from the interest of the principals, leading to legitimacy 
and accountability concerns.  This is an ongoing problem and the 
legal and political science literatures on administrative agencies are 
filled with examples of Congress and the President’s difficulties in 
ensuring the accountability of agencies.8  Agencies shirk, sabotage, 
develop their own agendas, and engage in other activities that 
produce agency costs.9  The higher the agency costs, the greater the 
concern that the agencies are operating independent of Congress 
and the President’s wishes, reducing the value of the delegations 
and potentially leading to bureaucratic drift.10  In light of these 
problems, scholars have identified and evaluated various 
monitoring and oversight mechanisms to constrain agencies and 
more closely align them with the interests of the principal 
                                                                                                                        
PUB. CHOICE 147 (1984); Barry M. Mitnick, The Theory of Agency: The Policing 
“Paradox” and Regulatory Behavior, 24 PUB. CHOICE 27 (1975). 
7 The coalition in Congress that created the agency may be more directly the 
principal than Congress as a whole.  See McCubbin, Noll & Weingast, supra note 6, 
at 255 (“[T]he coalition that forms to create an agency—the committee that drafted 
the legislation, the chamber majorities that approved it, and the president who 
signed it into law—will seek to ensure that the bargain struck among the 
members of the coalition does not unravel once the coalition disbands.”). 
8 See JOHN BREHM & SCOTT GATES, WORKING, SHIRKING, AND SABOTAGE: 
BUREAUCRATIC RESPONSE TO A DEMOCRATIC PUBLIC (2002); McCubbins, Noll & 
Weingast, supra note 6; Matthew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R. 
Weingast, Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and 
the Political Control of Agencies, 75 VA. L. REV. 431 (1989). 
9 See BREHM & GATES, supra note 8; Matthew D. McCubbins & Talbot Page, A 
Theory of Congressional Delegation, in CONGRESS: STRUCTURE AND POLICY 409, 410–14 
(Matthew D. McCubbins & Terry Sullivan eds. 1987) (describing the problems of 
agency shirking and slippage); Nicholas Bagley & Richard L. Revesz, Centralized 
Oversight of the Regulatory State, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1260, 1282–1300 (2006) 
(discussing how agency capture in the health and safety context results in 
overzealous regulations and inefficiencies). 
10 See McCubbins, Noll & Weingast, supra note 6, at 443–44 (noting the 
structure of an agency must be designed to be responsive to the constituencies the 
delegation was meant to satisfy to prevent policy drift); Kenneth A. Shepsle, 
Bureaucratic Drift, Coalitional Drift, and Time Consistency: A Comment on Macey, 8 
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 111 (1992). 
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(Congress or the enacting coalition in Congress).11  For my 
purposes, I will simplify and treat Congress and the President as 
joint principals. 
One common tool of oversight for Congress and the President 
is the appointment process.  Since the President and Congress act 
together to nominate and confirm potential appointees, they can 
coordinate and “arrange for appointees who more nearly share the 
political consensus on policy [as] a self-enforcing mechanism for 
assuring reliable [sic] agency performance.”12  With appointees 
who share a common approach serving as agency heads, the 
agencies might be less likely to deviate from the interests of 
Congress and the President, thereby presumably reducing agency 
costs and increasing accountability. 
Another tool to constrain agents is through ex ante procedural 
controls.13  Federal agencies are already subject to procedural 
constraints through the Administrative Procedure Act14 but the 
language in the Act is general and not specifically tailored to the 
different administrative agencies.  The President and Congress, 
however, could force agencies to adopt specific decision-making 
processes, use certain methodologies,15 or engage in agenda 
                                                     
11 See Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2255–
69 (2001) (evaluating informal controls on agency action such as “fire alarms,” 
reliance on experts, and interest group influence). 
12 Kenneth A. Shepsle, Bureaucracy and Intergovernmental Relations, in 
ANALYZING POLITICS: RATIONALITY, BEHAVIOR, AND INSTITUTIONS 429 (2d ed. 2010) 
13 Id. 
14 Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79–404, 60 Stat. 237 
(1946) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559, 701–706 (1994)). 
15 President Reagan was the first executive to require the use of cost-benefit 
analysis in agency decision-making.  Exec. Order No. 12,291, § 2, 3 C.F.R. 127, 128 
(1982) (“Regulatory action shall not be undertaken unless the potential benefits to 
society for the regulation outweigh the potential costs to society . . . .”).  For a 
discussion on cost-benefit analysis, see MATTHEW D. ADLER & ERIC A. POSNER, NEW 
FOUNDATIONS OF COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS (2006).  At times, administrative agencies 
have been required to conduct a feasibility analysis, instead of a cost-benefit 
analysis.  See, e.g., Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 § 6, Pub. L. No. 91–
596, 84 Stat. 1590, 1593 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5)) (requiring the agency to 
ensure “to the extent feasible” that exposure to hazards in the workplace does not 
harm workers’ health).  For a discussion of the merits of feasibility analysis, see 
Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. Posner, Against Feasibility Analysis, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 
657 (2010). 
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setting16 to narrow agency authority.  Still others have suggested 
that Congress and the President consider the institutional design17 
of agencies to reduce agency costs by creating institutional 
structures that shape the way the agencies operate and provide 
greater transparency and limit agency discretion.18 
Scholars have also examined the ex post tools available to 
ensure that the agencies continue to function within their 
delegated authority.  On an ongoing basis, Congress can use 
“police-patrols,”19 empower congressional committees to directly 
monitor agencies, or authorize individuals, corporations, or other 
parties subject to agency rule-making, to act as “fire-alarms”,20 and 
report agency misbehavior back to Congress.  In theory, once 
Congress observes bureaucratic drift or other problems, it could 
threaten to cut agency funding21 or conduct oversight hearings22 to 
question and embarrass agency heads. 
                                                     
16 In some circumstances, the agenda setting may be broad.  See, e.g., Exec. 
Order No. 13,563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3,821 (Jan. 21, 2011) (directing agencies to consider 
values such as equity, human dignity, fairness, and distributive impacts).  In 
contrast, Congress may try to control an agency by limiting its discretion.  See 
David Epstein & Sharyn O’Halloran, A Theory of Strategic Oversight: Congress, 
Lobbyists, and the Bureaucracy, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 227, 229 (1995) (“Legislators try 
to control agency actions through  administrative  procedures, such as budgeting 
authority, legislative vetoes, and limits on agency discretion.”). 
17 Christopher R. Berry & Jacob E. Gersen, The Unbundled Executive, 75 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 1385, 1424–26 (2008) (discussing the costs and benefits of concentrating 
executive power over administrative agencies). 
18 See Jacob E. Gersen, Designing Agencies, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON PUBLIC 
CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW 333, 339 (Daniel A. Farber & Anne Joseph O’Connell eds., 
2010) (noting that Congress may “manipulate the structure of agencies” to 
“control agency discretion”). 
19 See Mathew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight 
Overlooked: Police Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 165, 166 (1984) (“[A]t 
its own initiative, Congress examines a sample of executive-agency activities, with 
the aim of detecting and remedying any violations of legislative goals and, by its 
surveillance, discouraging such violations.”). 
20 See id. (“Congress establishes a system of rules, procedures, and informal 
practices that enable individual citizens and organized interest groups to examine 
administrative decisions . . . to charge executive agencies with violating 
congressional goals . . . .”); Kagan, supra note 11, at 2258 (“A primary mechanism 
of control “is a ‘fire alarm’ system” which “is  a set of  procedures  and  practices  
that enable  citizens  and  interest  groups  to  monitor  an  agency  and  report any  
perceived  errors  to  the relevant  congressional  committees.”). 
21 J.R. DeShazo & Jody Freeman, Public Agencies as Lobbyists, 105 COLUM. L. 
REV. 2217, 2235–36 (2005) (listing the potential sanctions for an agency’s failure to 
fulfill its mandates). 
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Similarly, the President has tools to limit agency discretion.23  
The President can issue directives by Executive Order regarding 
the breadth of agency authority in a particular area,24 engage in 
intra-executive review of agency actions, and even informally 
appropriate authority over agency function.25  The President could 
threaten to terminate26 or otherwise pressure agency heads to act 
within their delegated authority. 
A final, weaker mechanism to control agencies and reduce 
agency costs is judicial review.27  Individuals, companies, and other 
parties affected by agency decisions could bring suit challenging 
agency regulations in federal court, creating direct judicial 
oversight of agencies.28  In theory, the ex ante prospect of ex post 
                                                                                                                        
22 Id. 
23 See Kagan, supra note 11, at 2285–2303 (discussing President Clinton’s use 
of formal directives, Office of Management and Budget (OMB) review, and 
personal appropriation of regulatory action to control agency discretion); Sidney 
A. Shapiro & Ronald F. Wright, The Future of the Administrative Presidency: Turning 
Administrative Law Inside-Out, 65 U. MIAMI L. REV. 577, 583 (2011) (describing 
presidents’ strategies to control agencies, including increasing the size of the 
White House staff that oversees agencies, increasing the number of presidential 
appointees within agencies, and imposing reporting requirements). 
24 For instance, Executive Order 12,580 designated federal agencies as the 
President’s response authorities under the Comprehensive Environmental 
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act for facilities under their “jurisdiction 
custody and control.”  Exec. Order No. 12,580, 61 Fed. Reg. 45,871 (Aug. 28, 1996). 
25 See DeShazo & Freeman, supra note 21, at 2231–33 (arguing that inter-
agency review and coordination may control agency action); Kagan, supra note 11 
(describing presidential appropriation of agency action). 
26 See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Saving the Unitary Executive from Those Who Would 
Destroy and Abuse It: A Review of The Unitary Executive by Steven G. Calabresi & 
Christopher S. Yoo, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 593, 597–98 (2010) (noting the president 
can fire an administrator and replace her with someone who shares his views).   
27 See Jonathan R. Macey, Separated Powers and Positive Political Theory: The 
Tug of War over Administrative Agencies, 80 GEO. L.J. 671, 675 (1992) (arguing 
judicial review controls agency capture); Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard E. Levy, 
Heightened Scrutiny of the Fourth Branch: Separation of Powers and the Requirement of 
Adequate Reasons for Agency Decisions, 1987 DUKE L.J. 387, 394–95 (noting judicial 
review checks agencies’ ability to favor private interests). 
28 The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) provides a cause of action to 
challenge “final agency action,” including temporary and permanent regulations.  
Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2000).  Parties can also seek 
pre-enforcement judicial review of many agency actions, including review of 
regulations interpreting myriad statutes.  Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 
153–54 (1967) (allowing for pre-enforcement injunctive and declaratory judgment 
remedies concerning statutory construction).  For different approaches to judicial 
deference of agency regulations, see generally Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to 
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legal invalidation of agency regulations would constrain agency 
behavior.  But the use of courts to rein in agencies has led to a 
different issue: an increase in administrative law cases filling the 
docket of federal courts.29  Of course, courts lack the resources to 
adjudicate all administrative law cases and evaluate agency action, 
reducing their efficacy as a regulatory mechanism.  If agencies 
know in advance that the legal system lacks the capacity to review 
agency rule-making, the threat of legal invalidation is illusory and 
will not seriously constrain agencies.  The resource issue, combined 
with the Supreme Court’s decision in Chevron,30 narrowed the 
grounds upon which parties could challenge agency decisions and 
in effect took a tool for agency review off of the table.31 
                                                                                                                        
Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511; Stephen Breyer, Judicial 
Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 363 (1986). 
29 See Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain, Striking a Devil’s Bargain: The Federal Courts 
and Expanding Caseloads in the Twenty-First Century, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 473, 
477 (2009) (citing administrative agency appeals as accounting for nearly thirty-six 
percent of cases filed in the Ninth Circuit). 
30 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).  
See Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 190–91 (2006) 
(discussing the initial inquiry into whether the Chevron framework for judicial 
deference to agency action applies); Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, 
Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833 (2001) (exploring the scope of the Chevron 
doctrine); Adrian Vermeule & Jacob E. Gersen, Chevron as a Voting Rule, 116 YALE 
L.J. 676 (2007) (proposing a voting rule to determine judicial deference to agency 
statutory interpretation). 
31 Chevron entails a two-step approach to reviewing agency action: it first asks 
whether the statute has a gap or ambiguity, and if so, whether the agency’s 
interpretation of the ambiguity is reasonable.  Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43.  Later 
the Court clarified that Chevron rests on the “presumption that Congress, when it 
left ambiguity in a statute meant for implementation by an agency, understood 
that the ambiguity would be resolved, first and foremost, by the agency, and 
desired the agency (rather than the courts) to possess whatever degree of 
discretion the ambiguity allows.”  Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 
740–41 (1996).  Numerous scholars have written on the effect of Chevron.  See, e.g., 
Linda R. Cohen & Matthew L. Spitzer, Solving the Chevron Puzzle, 57 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 65 (1994); Orin S. Kerr, Shedding Light on Chevron: An Empirical 
Study of the Chevron Doctrine in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 15 YALE J. ON REG. 1 
(1998) (discussing the reasons for which a rational court would adopt the Chevron 
doctrine and exploring changes in court behavior induced by Chevron); Sidney A. 
Shapiro & Richard E. Levy, Judicial Incentives and Indeterminacy in Substantive 
Review of Administrative Decisions, 44 DUKE L.J. 1051 (1995) (examining the 
apparent breakdown of Chevron and its progeny). 
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Despite the fact that no mechanism can fully eliminate agency 
costs, domestic delegations are generally uncontroversial32 
because, in theory, politically accountable actors selected through 
the democratic process can generally review, monitor, or invalidate 
agency decisions.33  Congress, acting with the President, delegates 
decision-making authority to an agency; the President nominates 
the people to staff the agency; the Senate confirms or rejects the 
nominees; and the courts are open for judicial review of agency 
action.  In principle, each actor is representative of and responsive 
to the American public, and the process generally adheres to the 
Constitution’s formal requirements and structural limitations.  For 
domestic delegations, the benefits of agency expertise come with 
agency costs, which are reduced by formal and informal review 
mechanisms. 
The discussion here is certainly incomplete in that it neither 
provides a complete account of the entire suite of tools available to 
Congress and the President, nor comprehensively examines its 
efficacy.  Rather, this examination seeks to provide a window into 
the formal and informal mechanisms, and ex post and ex ante tools 
used to constrain domestic agencies.  By understanding the general 
operation of these mechanisms, we can now develop a framework 
to compare the domestic and international oversight mechanisms 
used to reduce agency costs. 
                                                     
32 Some think that all delegations are invalid as a transfer of legislative 
authority to the executive.  See generally DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT 
RESPONSIBILITY: HOW CONGRESS ABUSES THE PEOPLE THROUGH DELEGATION (2002).  
Others seek to limit delegations or impose a higher level of judicial review on 
agency actions.  See, e.g., Alex Forman, Note, A Call to Restore Limitations on 
Unbridled Congressional Delegations: American Trucking Ass’ns v. EPA, 34 IND. L. 
REV. 1477, 1497 (2001) (“The Supreme Court should have adopted the 
nondelegation doctrine as [a] means of monitoring the regulatory power of 
agencies, because it is consistent with constitutional norms as well as the 
doctrine’s underlying principles.”). 
33 See Cass R. Sunstein, Changing Conceptions of Administration, 1987 BYU L. 
REV. 927, 944 (noting how regulatory choices should be made “by officials subject 
to the control of a politically accountable actor”); JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS, 
AND GOVERNANCE: USING PUBLIC CHOICE TO IMPROVE PUBLIC LAW 153 (1997) 
(arguing that presidential control helps ensure democratic responsiveness and 
accountability). 
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2.2. International Delegations 
The relatively straightforward account about the costs and 
benefits of domestic delegations changes, however, with respect to 
international delegations.  International delegations are the transfer 
of executive, legislative, or adjudicative decision-making authority 
to an international organization, body, agency, panel, or other 
entity.34  With the significant exception of the international 
component, international delegations are conceptually identical to 
domestic delegations. 
International delegations are either non-binding or binding.35  
Non-binding international delegations assign decision-making 
authority to an international body, but do not make the decisions 
of that body automatically enforceable within the delegating state’s 
(the principal’s) legal system.36  Consider the following modified 
example of a delegation of adjudicative authority drawn from the 
North American Free Trade Agreement (“NAFTA”).37  The United 
States, Canada, and Mexico want to create a free trade zone 
encompassing each country and sign a treaty to that effect.  Under 
the terms of the treaty, the states create an adjudicative body or 
appeals panel to hear potential claims regarding the treatment of 
companies operating within the free trade zone.  In this example, 
the United States has delegated adjudicative authority to the 
international appeals panel created by the treaty to resolve claims 
arising under the treaty; this transfer of authority is an 
international delegation. 
                                                     
34 See Bradley & Kelley, supra note 2, at 2 (surveying the kinds of 
international delegations); Guzman & Landsidle, supra note 2, at 1697–1701 
(questioning the proper definition of international delegations). 
35 Bradley & Kelley, supra note 2, at 4; Guzman & Landsidle, supra note 2, at 
1697–1701. 
36 See Bradley & Kelley, supra note 2, at 4 (concluding that international 
delegations exist even when states give an international body only nonbinding 
power to issue resolutions, proposals, and opinions). 
37 See North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, Pub. L. 
No. 103–182, 107 Stat. 2057 (Dec. 8, 1993); American President: A Reference Resource: 
Clinton Signs NAFTA—December 8, 1993, THE MILLER CTR., UNIV. OF VA. (1993), 
http://millercenter.org/academic/americanpresident/events/12_08 (last visited 
May 1, 2013) (detailing the events leading up to the signing of NAFTA); 
Demetrius Andreas Floudas & Luis Fernando Rojas, Some Thoughts on NAFTA and 
Trade Integration in the American Continent, 52 INT’L PROB. 371, 371–72 (2000) 
(summarizing NAFTA and the events leading up to the agreement). 
02_ABEBE (DO NOT DELETE) 8/6/2013  7:53 PM 
2013] COSTS OF INTERNATIONAL DELEGATIONS 505 
 
The appeals panel could issue judgments regarding claims 
brought under the treaty but, if the delegation were non-binding, 
the appeals panel’s judgments would not be immediately 
enforceable or provide a rule of decision in U.S. courts.  Some 
political branch action (i.e., action by Congress and/or the 
President) would be necessary before those judgments have legal 
effect in the United States. 
Non-binding international delegations are generally not the 
source of the most serious constitutional concerns because some 
political branch action is necessary before any decision, judgment, 
or regulation becomes binding in the United States.38  In other 
words, Congress and the President must act before anything 
becomes enforceable in the United States.  Presumably, the 
constitutional problems here are minimal and the agency costs are 
low, or at least similar to those of domestic delegations. 
For some, the concerns about international delegations rise 
dramatically when the United States transfers binding decision-
making authority to an international entity.39  To illustrate the 
point, imagine that the NAFTA appeals panel in the example 
above could hear claims and its decisions would be immediately 
enforceable as a rule of decision in U.S. courts.  After the appeals 
panel issues its judgment, Congress and the President would not 
have the option of noncompliance by refusing to act.  The 
judgment would have immediate legal effect.  For this reason, 
critics argue that binding international delegations are 
constitutionally problematic and exacerbate agency costs. 
In addition, international delegations create formal and 
structural constitutional problems.  For example, binding 
                                                     
38 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 
§ 111(3) (1986) (“[A] ‘non-self-executing’ agreement will not be given effect as law 
in the absence of necessary implementation.”); Curtis A. Bradley, International 
Delegations, The Structural Constitution, and Non-Self-Execution, 55 STAN. L. REV. 
1557, 1587 (2003) (discussing non-self-executing treaties and the requirement that 
Congress implement them before they override federal and state statutes that are 
enforceable in U.S. courts). 
39 See McGinnis, supra note 1, at 1714 (“International delegation of domestic 
power [] presents a dilemma for the separation of powers in an age of 
globalization.”); Guzman & Landsidle, supra note 2, at 1697–1701 (considering 
definitions of international delegations); Ku, supra note 1 (questioning the 
constitutionality of certain transfers of power to international delegations); Yoo, 
supra note 1, at 1958 (considering the constitutional limit of the application of 
treaties in suits against individuals). 
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international delegations of legislative authority may conflict with 
Article I procedural requirements for law-making40 and 
appointments.41  Typically, binding international delegations are 
part of Article II treaties or congressional-executive agreements 
that, by their terms, create an international body.  Imagine that the 
United States signs and ratifies a multilateral treaty through the 
Article II treaty process (with the advice and consent of a two-
thirds majority of the Senate).  The treaty creates an international 
body that has binding authority to set minimum capital 
requirements for banks.  The United States, as party to the treaty, 
has delegated the determination of capital requirements to an 
international body.  Subsequently, the body acts and determines 
that all parties to the treaty must set the capital requirements for 
their domestic banks at ten percent.  Thus, the United States has a 
binding obligation to comply with the new capital requirements. 
For critics, this binding international delegation of legislative 
authority permits the international body to create new “law” with 
respect to capital requirements in violation of the Constitution’s 
bicameralism and presentment requirements.42  The international 
body’s “legislation” would be automatically enforceable as U.S. 
law without further political branch action, circumventing the 
House of Representatives, the Senate, and President. 
                                                     
40 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7.  See Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 511 (2008) 
(rejecting the proposition that decisions by the International Court of Justice 
(“ICJ”) bind U.S. courts, finding instead that the “[t]he conduct of the foreign 
relations of our Government is committed by the Constitution to the Executive 
and Legislative—’the political’—Departments”); Natural Res. Def. Council v. 
EPA, 464 F.3d 1, 8 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (noting that if future international 
environmental agreements pursuant to the Montreal Protocol are domestically 
enforceable law, then serious constitutional problems are raised by the 
international delegation of Congress’s law-making authority). 
41 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2–3.  See John C. Yoo, The New Sovereignty and the Old 
Constitution: The Chemical Weapons Convention and the Appointments Clause, 15 
CONST. COMMENT. 87–130 (1998) (discussing the constitutionality of international 
delegations of power under the Appointments Clause).  
42 See Natural Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 464 F.3d at 8 (discussing the 
enforceability of future agreements); Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 
(1989) (“Congress generally cannot delegate its legislative power to another 
Branch.”); Ernest A. Young, supra note 1, at 529 (2003) (“[B]ecause supranational 
lawmaking operates outside those systems of checks and balances and 
accountability, it risks undermining our Constitution’s institutional strategy.”). 
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Similarly, a binding international delegation to an international 
agency would implicate the Constitution’s Appointments Clause43 
and potentially Article II requirements for treaties.44  Imagine that 
the United States joins a multilateral treaty that creates an 
international agency with the authority to set binding regulations 
for the permissible amount of carbon emissions for each state party 
to the treaty.  Therefore, the international agency’s director and 
staff would have the authority to regulate the amount of carbon 
emissions in the United States and their determination would have 
immediate legal effect in the United States.45 
In this example, the director and staff of the international 
agency would not be appointed by the President or confirmed by 
the Senate; she would be a representative of the international 
agency and appointed consistent with the terms of the treaty or the 
agency’s internal rules.  This arrangement would seemingly violate 
the Appointments Clause.  Moreover, since the international 
agency can make ongoing binding determinations regarding its 
area of regulatory authority—in this case, carbon emissions—such 
determinations could be interpreted as creating a new international 
obligation for the United States.  And, if it is a new international 
obligation for the United States, it might require a new treaty in 
conformance with the Treaty Clause.46 
Perhaps the greatest concern for critics is binding delegations 
of adjudicative authority to international judicial bodies.47  The 
                                                     
43 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2. 
44 For a discussion of the constitutional implications of binding grants of 
authority to international delegations, see Bradley, supra note 38; David M. 
Golove, The New Confederalism: Treaty Delegations of Legislative, Executive, and 
Judicial Authority, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1697 (2003); Ku, supra note 1, at 121; Yoo, supra 
note 41; Michael J. Glennon & Allison R. Hayward, Collective Security and the 
Constitution: Can the Commander in Chief Power Be Delegated to the United Nations?, 
82 GEO. L.J. 1573 (1994); Jim C. Chen, Appointments with Disaster: The 
Unconstitutionality of Binational Arbitral Review Under the United States-Canada Free 
Trade Agreement, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1455 (1992). 
45 See Natural Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 464 F.3d at 1. 
46 Id. at 8 (noting that if the future agreements created under the Montreal 
Protocol are law, then Congress has “authorized amendment to a treaty without 
presidential signature or Senate ratification, in violation of Article II of the 
Constitution”). 
47 In Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, petitioner argued that the United States was 
obligated to comply with the Vienna Convention as interpreted by the 
International Court of Justice (“ICJ”).  548 U.S. 331 (2006).  The petitioner argued 
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treaties creating the United Nations,48 NAFTA,49 and the World 
Trade Organization (“WTO”),50 among others, each include a 
quasi-judicial body to hear claims arising under each treaty.  For 
example, NAFTA’s Article 19 Arbitration Panels51 hear claims and 
issue judgments.  Article 19 judgments provide a rule of decision 
enforceable in U.S. courts, seemingly violating Article III limits on 
the delegations of judicial authority52 and the Appointments 
Clause.53  The WTO’s appeals panel54 hears cases and issues 
binding judgments, and the United States is party to several 
arbitral or claims agreements; for example, the Iran-United States 
Claims Tribunal55 can issue binding decisions. 
                                                                                                                        
that the Supreme Court should reconsider a previous holding because the ICJ had 
recently interpreted the Convention in the LaGrand and Avena cases and reached 
an opposite conclusion.  Id. at 333.  The Supreme Court rejected this proposition, 
stating the ICJ’s interpretation deserves only “respectful consideration.”  Id. at 
352–53.  See Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. at 510 (“If ICJ judgments were instead 
regarded as automatically enforceable domestic law, they would be immediately 
and directly binding on state and federal courts pursuant to the Supremacy 
Clause.”).  For a discussion of the problems related to the delegation of binding 
adjudicative authority to international bodies, see Mark L. Movsesian, Judging 
International Judgments, 48 VA. J. INT’L L. 65 (2007); Jenny S. Martinez, Towards an 
International Judicial System, 56 STAN. L. REV. 429 (2003); McGinnis, supra note 1. 
48 U.N. Charter art. 92 (designating the ICJ as the principal judicial organ of 
the United Nations). 
49 North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., art. 19, Dec. 17, 
1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA]. 
50 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization art. IV, 
§ 3, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154 [hereinafter Marrakesh Agreement].  Notably, 
the Appellate Body that hears appeals from panel reports brought by WTO 
Members was established in 1995 under Article 17 of the Understanding on Rules 
and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes.  See Dispute Settlement: 
Appellate Body, WTO, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/appellate_ 
body_e.htm (last visited May 1, 2013). 
51 NAFTA, supra note 49, art. 19. 
52 U.S. CONST. art. III, §§ 1–2. 
53 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. 
54 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of 
Disputes art. 17, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 50, Annex 2, 
1869 U.N.T.S. 401.  For examples of Appellate Body reports, see Appellate Body 
Report, United States—Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, 1, 22–
23, WT/DS2/AB/R (April 29, 1996); Appellate Body Report, Brazil—Measures 
Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres, ¶ 179, WT/DS332/AB/R  (Dec. 3, 2007). 
55 The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal was established in the Algiers 
Accords.  See Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular 
Republic of Algeria Concerning the Settlement of Claims by the Government of 
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The International Court of Justice (“ICJ”),56 the legal arm of the 
United Nations, can hear claims arising under the Charter and 
international law generally with the consent of the state parties.  In 
a series of cases concerning the Vienna Convention on Consular 
Relations, the ICJ concluded that the United States was in violation 
of the convention for failing to provide foreign nationals in police 
custody with access to their respective consulates.57  Subsequently, 
the Supreme Court considered whether the ICJ decisions were 
“self-executing” and entitled to immediate legal effect in the 
United States.58  Though the Court held that the structure of the 
U.N. Charter and the absence of definitive language demonstrated 
that ICJ decisions were “non-self-executing,”59 concern increased 
about the ability of foreign courts to impose international law in 
the United States without U.S. political-branch action.60 
                                                                                                                        
the United States of America and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 
art. IV, Jan. 19, 1981, available at General Documents: Claims Settlement Declaration 19 
January 1981, IRAN-U.S. CLAIMS TRIBUNAL, http://www.iusct.net/General%20 
Documents/2-Claims%20Settlement%20Declaration.pdf. 
56 U.N. Charter art. 92; PEMMARAJU S. RAO, UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON 
TRADE & DEV., COURSE ON DISPUTE SETTLEMENT—MODULE 1.2. GENERAL TOPICS: 
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, at 11, UNCTAD/EDM/Misc.232/Add.19 (2003), 
available at http://unctad.org/en/Docs/edmmisc232add19_en.pdf (listing the 
types of jurisdiction the ICJ holds, including contentious jurisdiction in which the 
states submit the dispute by consent for a binding decision). 
57 LaGrand Case (Ger. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466, ¶¶ 90–91 (June 27); Case 
Concerning Avena and other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12, ¶¶ 
63, 76 (Mar. 31). 
58 Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008). 
59 Id. at 509 (“We agree with this construction of Article 94.  The Article is not 
a directive to domestic courts.  It does not provide that the United States ‘shall’ or 
‘must’ comply with an ICJ decision, nor indicate that the Senate that ratified the 
U.N. Charter intended to vest ICJ decisions with immediate legal effect in 
domestic courts.”). 
60 For an overview of the debate regarding the Court’s legal reasoning in 
Medellín and the future of self-execution treaty cases, see Carlos Manuel Vazquez, 
Treaties as Law of the Land: The Supremacy Clause and the Judicial Enforcement of 
Treaties, 122 HARV. L. REV. 599 (2008) (criticizing Medellín’s self-execution analysis); 
Curtis A. Bradley, Self-Execution and Treaty Duality, 2009 SUP. CT. REV. 131 
(supporting the self-execution analysis).  See also David H. Moore, Law(makers) of 
the Land: The Doctrine of Treaty Non-Self-Execution, 122 HARV. L. REV. 32 (2009). 
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Beyond formal constitutional requirements, binding 
international delegations implicate general federalism61 and 
separation of powers62 concerns.  Federalism63 envisions certain 
limits on the national government that will be lost if international 
institutions can make decisions, issue regulatory directives or 
resolve legal claims that are binding in the United States.64  And 
even if the President can represent U.S. interests at the 
international institutions—perhaps addressing some accountability 
concerns—the transfer of decision-making authority away from 
Congress and the states to the President encourages a 
consolidation of power in the executive branch.65  For critics, 
binding international delegations conflict with the Constitution’s 
                                                     
61 See Neil S. Siegel, International Delegations and the Values of Federalism, 71 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 93, 100–06 (2008) (discussing the ways in which 
international delegations may either promote or undermine federalism). 
62 See, e.g., LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES 
CONSTITUTION 272 (2d ed. 1996); Neil Kinkopf, Of Devolution, Privatization, and 
Globalization: Separation of Powers Limits on Congressional Authority to Assign Federal 
Power to Non-Federal Actors, 50 RUTGERS L. REV. 331 (1998); Ku, supra note 1, at 121; 
Yoo, supra note 41. 
63 Cf. Siegel, supra note 61, at 96–99 (“A federal system entails a vertical 
division of regulatory authority between the national government and 
subnational states. . . . [A] powerful check on the abuse of government power is 
said to exist when multiple levels of government compete for regulatory authority 
and political power is diffused.”). 
64 See id. at 101 (“Turning to the other federalism values discussed above, 
international delegations likely undermine all of them to the extent that such 
delegations reduce state regulatory control, as opposed to leaving state control 
unchanged and just reducing national control.”).  See also Curtis A. Bradley, The 
Treaty Power and American Federalism, 97 MICH. L. REV. 390 (1998). 
65 Golove has described the concerns of some scholars that international 
delegations are antidemocratic and lack the necessary accountability to the 
American people.  Golove, supra note 44, at 1699–1700.  Cf. Edward T. Swaine, The 
Constitutionality of International Delegations, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1492, 1540 (2004) 
(noting that although the United States retains a veto on the U.N. security council, 
that power is held by the executive branch officials and “Congress still loses 
control”); Bradley, supra note 38, at 1559–60 (“Most typically, these transfers may 
increase the relative power of the executive branch, both because they often 
delegate the powers of other branches, and because the United States is 
represented in these institutions by executive branch agents.”).  But cf. Ku, supra 
note 1 (arguing that courts should apply formalist principles to see whether 
international delegations are constitutional because formalism, rather than 
functionalism, ensures accountability). 
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formal limits66 and traditional separation of powers and federalism 
concerns. 
The failure to conform to formal and structural constitutional 
limitations produces a second and perhaps larger problem with 
binding international delegations—a lack of democratic legitimacy 
and political accountability for those entities exercising delegated 
authority.67  For critics, international institutions are not 
exclusively or even predominantly accountable or responsive to 
the American interests.68  They are only accountable to the states 
that created them—the United States and the dozens of other 
member states (the joint principals) that comprise the international 
institution’s membership.  In the domestic context, at least 
Congress, the President, and the courts can proscribe delegations 
to administrative agencies, and monitor their behavior.  In the 
international context, this oversight structure cannot be replicated.  
Thus, agency costs are low (or lower) in domestic delegations and 
higher in international delegations.  In effect, delegations to 
domestic agencies are the ideal type: they are constrained by a 
United States principal subject to the American political process.  
Whatever problems with agency costs exist in the domestic 
context, they pale in comparison to the costs created by delegating 
binding authority to an international institution. 
                                                     
66 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (endowing the President, “by and with the 
Advice and Consent of the Senate,” with authority to make treaties and appoint 
ambassadors and officers of the United States); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cls. 2–3 
(establishing that every bill, order, resolution, or vote passed by the House and 
Senate, before becoming a law or being given effect, must be presented to the 
President and subjected to re-approval by Congress in the event that the President 
vetoes).  Article I of the Constitution also provides for bicameralism. 
67 See Benedict Kingsbury et al., The Emergence of Global Administrative Law, 68 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 15, 26 (2005) (“In our view, international lawyers can no 
longer credibly argue that there are no real democracy or legitimacy deficits in 
global administrative governance . . . .“); Ruth W. Grant & Robert O. Keohane, 
Accountability and Abuses of Power in World Politics, 99 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 29, 37 
(2005) (conceding there is a lack of democratic accountability of international 
bodies).  Cf. Bradley, supra note 38, at 1558 (noting the lack of transparency in 
international decision-making may increase accountability concerns). 
68 See Swaine, supra note 65, at 1601–02 (“International delegations give 
power to officials and institutions that ‘are not accountable, directly or indirectly, 
exclusively to the American electorate,’ and indeed may not be accountable to 
much of anyone at all.”); Ku, supra note 1, at 125 (concluding it is the 
characteristics of evolving international organization that make them 
unaccountable entities within the United States). 
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Given the apparent constitutional concerns and high agency 
costs, what should be done?  Since the United States continues to 
delegate both non-binding and binding authority to international 
institutions, scholars have focused on the ex ante national 
constitutional design mechanisms to regulate all international 
delegations and limit binding international delegations.  The next 
Section examines those proposals. 
3. CRITIQUING PROPOSALS TO LIMIT INTERNATIONAL DELEGATIONS 
3.1. Raising the Enactment Costs of Binding International Delegations 
The combination of formal constitutional concerns and high 
agency costs has motivated proposals to make binding 
international delegations more difficult and, as a consequence, 
infrequent.  How do critics purport to solve the problems created 
by binding international delegations?  Three proposals are of 
particular prominence.69  They either endorse the adoption of 
interpretive tools to effectively create a non-self execution default 
rule for all treaties and congressional-executive agreements that 
make international delegations or, alternatively, create a process 
rule to force all binding international delegations to go through the 
Article II treaty process. 
One proposal suggests that courts should adopt a default rule 
of non-self-execution for all international delegations that purport 
to create a commitment or obligation for the United States.70  Thus, 
if the Unites States wants to create a binding legal obligation, 
Congress and the President must specifically indicate the intent to 
bind the United States in the congressional-executive agreement or 
treaty that purports to make the international delegation.  The 
proposal rests on both formal constitutional grounds outlined in 
Section 2.  Another justification rests on additional consequentialist 
                                                     
69 A fourth proposal draws from the administrative structure of domestic 
delegations and endorses the creation of an Administrative Procedure Act for 
foreign affairs delegations to limit the President’s discretion.  See Oona A. 
Hathaway, Presidential Power Over International Law: Restoring the Balance, 119 YALE 
L.J. 140, 219-24, 239–41 (2009) (proposing administrative law principles for a 
portion of international law issues and limitations of broad foreign affairs 
delegations to the executive).   
70 See John C. Yoo, Treaties and Public Lawmaking: A Textual and Structural 
Defense of Non-Self-Execution, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2218, 2254–57 (1999) (arguing for a 
rule in which treaties are not self-executing unless lawmakers explicitly state so). 
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concerns, namely that “[i]nternational delegations, by potentially 
binding the United States ex ante to rules and decisions it has not 
specifically approved, may in fact reduce the case-by-case 
flexibility often thought important in foreign affairs.”71  Binding 
international delegations are constitutionally infirm, create 
accountability problems, and constrain the United States in 
international politics.  
A similar proposal suggests that the United States adopt a 
“super-strong clear statement rule,”72 presumably requiring 
Congress and the President to explicitly state their intent to bind 
the United States through an international delegation of 
adjudicatory authority.73  In the absence of a “super-strong” clear 
statement, courts would treat judgments of international legal 
tribunals as non-self executing and would not create any binding 
legal obligation in the United States.  Though it is not entirely 
obvious how courts would distinguish between a clear statement 
rule and a “super-strong clear statement rule,”74 this proposal is 
designed to make binding international delegations of adjudicative 
authority significantly more difficult and limit the binding effect of 
judgments from international judicial tribunals. 
A third option proposes to “raise the costs of enacting”75 
binding international delegations by requiring that such 
delegations be made only through the Article II treaty process.76  
The Treaty Clause’s supermajority requirement would have the 
effect of prohibiting binding international delegations through 
congressional-executive agreements (which, like domestic 
                                                     
71 Bradley, supra note 38, at 1585. 
72 Julian G. Ku, International Delegations and the New World Court Order, 81 
WASH. L. REV. 1, 7 (2006). 
73 Id. 
74 Ku argues a super-strong clear statement could come from implementing 
legislation or in the language of the treaty itself.  He notes the Optional Protocol to 
the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations does not contain a sufficiently clear 
statement, which states “[d]isputes arising out of the interpretation or application 
of the Convention shall lie within the compulsory jurisdiction of the International 
Court of Justice. . . .”  Under Ku’s analysis a super-strong clear statement might 
discuss the mechanisms of domestic enforcement or specific standards for U.S. 
courts to follow when enforcing international judgments, but it is unclear exactly 
when a clear statement becomes a super-strong clear statement.  Id. at 62–63. 
75 McGinnis, supra note 1, at 1715. 
76 Id. at 1742. 
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legislation, go through both houses of Congress and are signed by 
the President) and through presidential-executive agreements 
(which are negotiated and signed by the President without 
congressional involvement).77  Among other things, the proposal is 
framed as a compromise between a permissive regime78 that allows 
binding international delegations without additional limitations 
and a prohibitory regime79 that restricts them outright.  Though 
they vary slightly, each of these proposals represents a 
constitutionally inspired limit to binding international delegations.  
Most important, the proposals are concerned with the same 
problems, namely a lack of formal adherence to constitutional 
limitations and structural requirements, combined with the high 
agency costs from poor accountability and legitimacy. 
At this point, one might note a tension between the formalist 
limitations endorsed by critics of international delegations and 
functionalist justifications invoked in this Article.  Critics are 
concerned with lack of conformance with constitutional 
requirements that will result in high agency costs, while this 
Article focuses on the reduction of agency costs through oversight 
mechanisms.  But despite the critics’ contention that binding 
international delegations are inconsistent with the Constitution, 
none of the proposals fully embraces the formalism that they 
espouse and prohibits all binding international delegations.  
Rather, they explicitly attempt to limit binding international 
delegations on functionalist grounds, namely concerns about 
agency costs.  Thus, despite the formalist concerns outlined above, 
the debate really centers on whether or not the potential for high 
agency costs justifies limitations on binding international 
delegations, and this Article attempts to answer that question. 
Since the United States has and will continue to delegate 
authority to international institutions, and there is no obvious 
reason to think that this trend will stop, international delegations 
will likely remain a tool for the United States and the international 
community to deal with challenges of global concern.  If this 
                                                     
77 Id. at 1747 (“Because it is the treaty power that uniquely authorizes 
international delegations, a congressional-executive agreement would not be 
sufficient.”). 
78 Id. at 1736 (describing the categorical permission model). 
79 Id. 
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characterization of the future of international delegations is 
accurate, is there an alternative basis for limiting international 
delegations?  Each of the proposals outlined above argues that 
binding international delegations create serious problems related 
to democratic deficit, legitimacy, or accountability; in other words, 
they create high agency costs.  And, according to some scholars, 
these costs are high enough to warrant some limit on binding 
delegations.  Given this link, it is important to evaluate the agency 
costs claim. 
3.2. Specification of Agency Costs 
Critics of binding international delegations implicitly evaluate 
these delegations through the same lens that they apply to 
domestic delegations: they look to formal constitutional 
requirements and the agency costs from lack of political 
accountability.  Since the oversight mechanisms available in 
domestic delegations to agencies are unavailable for international 
delegations to unaccountable international institutions, the critics 
argue that additional procedural constraints are necessary to make 
it harder for the United States to delegate binding authority. 
The key justification for limits on international delegations is 
the presence of high agency costs.  However, the lack of specificity 
in the claim regarding agency costs and lack of clarity regarding 
assumptions about the incentives of international institutions 
create doubt about the need for limits on binding international 
delegations.  Let’s begin with a consideration of agency costs. 
3.2.1. Defining and Measuring High Agency Costs 
The literature is not always clear about the empirical or 
normative baseline to determine what constitutes high agency 
costs.  The common criticisms in the literature make comparative 
claims about the nature of agency costs in domestic and 
international delegations and conclude that the increase in scale in 
the international context necessarily means high agency costs.80  
                                                     
80 See, e.g., McGinnis, supra note 1, at 1714 (“[D]elegations raise dramatic 
problems of agency costs, because international agents’ work is less transparent 
and less subject to control than domestic agents’ work.”); T. Alexander Aleinikoff, 
Thinking Outside the Sovereignty Box: Transnational Law and the U.S. Constitution, 82 
Tex. L. Rev. 1989, 2002 (2004) (“In the case of domestic delegations—even those 
 
02_ABEBE (DO NOT DELETE) 8/6/2013  7:53 PM 
516 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 34:3 
 
But even with a comparative claim, we still need more guidance 
about the agency cost “threshold” that international delegations 
must cross to warrant the significant constitutional limits that 
critics endorse.  Even if we assume that critics are most concerned 
about agency costs in the comparative context, we would expect 
agency costs to vary according to the nature of the international 
delegation (legislative, judicial, or regulatory);81 the organizational 
structure of the body exercising decision-making authority;82 the 
issue over which the organization has authority,83 and the scope of 
domestic interference.  But we would also expect the same thing in 
domestic delegations.  Agency costs likely vary with respect to the 
type, scope, and issue area of the domestic delegation; and the 
institutional design, internal procedures, and decision-making 
processes of domestic agencies.  To even begin a serious 
comparison of agency costs in the domestic and international 
context would require some consideration of these factors, among 
many others. 
Moreover, it is not clear why agency costs are necessarily 
always higher in international delegations than domestic 
delegations.  Consider this simple example.  The United States 
signs a multilateral treaty with three small countries creating limits 
                                                                                                                        
that license a fair degree of autonomy for administrative agencies—there are 
significant checks on agency behavior in the form of appropriations, oversight, 
amending legislation, and publicity.  These checks are obviously weaker at the 
international level-particularly the ability of the United States to overturn 
decisions of transnational bodies, which would require the amendment of a 
treaty.”). 
81 See Siegel, supra note 61, at 95 (noting that the implications of international 
delegations vary based on whether the delegation merely transfers a regulatory 
power that would otherwise be exercised by the federal government or if the 
international delegation creates legislation that would not otherwise be 
promulgated by the federal government); Judith L. Goldstein & Richard H. 
Steinberg, Negotiate or Litigate? Effects of WTO Judicial Delegation on U.S. Trade 
Politics, 71 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 257, 257 (2008) (noting the surprising amount 
of judicial lawmaking that has occurred under the WTO when the same action 
would face domestic resistance). 
82 See Barbara Koremenos, When, What, and Why Do States Choose to Delegate?, 
71 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 151, 174–77 (2008) (noting that the design of a treaty or 
organization will influence the degree to which states’ choose to delegate). 
83 See Oona A. Hathaway, International Delegation and State Sovereignty, 71 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 115, 141–45 (2008) (arguing that international delegations 
of authority on a variety of issues create significant benefits that cannot be 
achieved absent delegation). 
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on the expropriation of foreign property.  The treaty creates an 
eleven judge “International Expropriation Court” (“IEC”) with 
binding adjudicative authority to hear claims and issue final 
judgments; it is a binding international delegation by the United 
States to the IEC through a treaty.  Agency costs, in theory, might 
be high since the United States cannot control the IEC’s judgments, 
as they would be automatically enforceable in U.S. courts. 
However, let us assume further that the treaty requires that the 
IEC operate by majority vote for all decisions but permits the 
United States to appoint six of the eleven judges.  With this 
majority, the United States would certainly have strong influence 
over how the IEC will dispose of all claims, including those 
relating to American interests.  Here, agency costs are low because 
the IEC’s voting structure effectively ensures that it would reflect 
U.S. interests.  The purpose of this example is to show that agency 
costs are difficult to assess and that a simple “international versus 
domestic” distinction might not be determinative.  In fact, 
depending on the agency, the agency costs in a domestic 
delegation might very well be higher than a binding international 
delegation of adjudicative authority. 
 Moreover, it is not obvious who critics think the principal is 
for purposes of international delegations.84  At the highest level of 
generality, the principal might be the American people and the 
claim would be that the international organization is unlikely to be 
responsive to its collective will.  However, it is Congress, not the 
American people, which delegates authority.  Congress, therefore, 
could be the principal.  But, when Congress acts, it is reflecting the 
view of the enacting coalition, along with the President, for the 
treaty or congressional agreement that creates the specific 
international delegation.  Without greater specification of the 
principal, it is hard to assess the agency cost claim in the 
international context. 
Finally, critics do not explain why they think that international 
institutions would be more vulnerable than domestic agencies to 
agency costs stemming from agency drift,85 coalition drift,86 or 
                                                     
84 See note 7, supra (describing the lack of clarity on who exactly constitutes 
the principal in the domestic setting—Congress as a whole or the individual 
committees). 
85 Cf. McCubbins, Noll & Weingast, Structure and Process, Politics and Policy, 
supra note 8, at 440–44 (exploring potential structural and process limitations that, 
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interest group capture,87 creating high agency costs.  Of course, the 
United States might delegate binding authority to an international 
institution today that, over time, might expand the scope of its 
authority beyond the initial delegation, become beholden to 
interest groups, or develop interests separate and independent 
from the states which create it.  These are certainly legitimate 
concerns, but it is unclear why the agency costs that these issues 
generate are significantly higher in the international context than in 
the domestic context. 
3.2.2. Incentives of International Institutions 
The problems with under-specification also exist with respect 
to the characterization of international institutions exercising 
delegated authority.  The literature is unclear about the basis for 
assumptions about the structure and strategic incentives of 
international institutions.  Though scholars do not always 
explicitly state their assumptions about international institutions 
and their relationship to the United States, these assumptions drive 
much of the concern about agency costs. 
As an initial matter, it is difficult to know ex ante with any 
certainty the likely structure, procedural rules, and decision-
making processes of the international institutions that might 
exercise binding authority.  The issue, type, and scope of the 
delegation have consequences for the internal structure of the 
international institution, making general claims more speculative.  
Despite these problems, a few assumptions about the operation of 
international institutions seem to motivate the criticism of 
international delegations. 
One clear assumption is that international institutions are 
staffed with cosmopolitan foreign elites who are either dismissive 
                                                                                                                        
through agency design, can minimize agency drift or deviation away from the 
intended policies of the coalition creating the agency). 
86 See Shepsle, supra note 10, at 114–15 (observing that coalitional drift—
changes in legislative or presidential preferences resulting from elections or the 
shifting winds of public opinion—moderates interest group expectations). 
87 See Macey, supra note 27, at 687–92, 702–03 (concluding that the Supreme 
Court’s “liberal rules of standing for structurally disenfranchised groups” are part 
of the independent judiciary’s response to the problem of interest group capture 
of administrative agencies). 
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of or openly hostile to American interests.88  These elites will 
naturally reflect the interests of their respective states, and, so the 
argument goes, their interests will clash with American priorities.  
In principal-agent terms, there are many joint principals with 
conflicting preferences.  The international institution is an 
aggregation of people who, on average, will not have American 
interests in mind.  Since these foreign elites will be exercising 
binding decision-making authority, the agency costs of 
international delegations are high. 
A variant of this assumption is that international institutions 
(and international law) are tools to constrain American power, 
making them unlikely to represent American interests.89  Since the 
United States has a predominant role in international politics, other 
states cannot compete directly through traditional economic, 
political, or military means.  Instead, such states seek to enmesh 
the United States in a web of international organizations, tribunals, 
and agencies in order to limit the United States’ ability to dominate 
world affairs.90  If the United States transfers binding authority to 
international institutions that operate as tools for weaker states to 
constrain the United States, the agency costs are, by definition, 
likely to be high. 
While it is certainly true that international institutions will not 
perfectly reflect U.S. interests and that weaker states might try and 
use institutions to constrain the United States, it also clear that the 
United States has been the leading force in the conception, creation, 
and use of international institutions across a number of issue 
areas.91  The most salient international institutions in world 
                                                     
88 See, e.g., John R. Bolton, The Risks and Weaknesses of the International Criminal 
Court from America’s Perspective, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 167, 173 (2001) (“[O]ur 
main concern should be for our country’s top civilian and military leaders, those 
responsible for our defense and foreign policy.  They are the real potential targets 
of the ICC’s politically unaccountable prosecutor.”). 
89 See ROBERT KAGAN, OF PARADISE AND POWER: AMERICA AND EUROPE IN THE 
NEW WORLD ORDER 39–40 (2003) (“It is also understandable that Europeans should 
fear American unilateralism and seek to constrain it as best they can through such 
institutions as the United Nations.  Those who cannot act unilaterally themselves 
naturally want to have a mechanism for controlling those who can.”). 
90 Id. at 40 (citing the example of the U.N. Security Council as a 
“multilateralising” organization substituting for the power that weak states lack 
individually to counterbalance U.S. hegemony). 
91 See JOHN ALLPHIN MOORE, JR. & JERRY PUBANTZ, THE NEW UNITED NATIONS: 
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 43–51 (2005) 
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affairs—the United Nations and the World Trade Organization—
are both the products of U.S. efforts to shape the world consistent 
with American interests and, arguably, those of the international 
community.  In fact, for reasons discussed earlier, the United States 
is unlikely to ever delegate binding decision-making authority to 
international institutions that it cannot influence or control.  Rather 
than being constrained by international institutions, the United 
States generally delegates to those international institutions that it 
created and over which it exercises disproportionate influence.  To 
put it bluntly, the United States is likely to be the dominant 
principal of an agent that it designed and over which, for the most 
part, it exercises significant control. 
3.3. The Potential Benefits of Binding International Delegations 
The critical literature on binding international delegations 
focuses almost exclusively on the agency costs problem but does 
not always weigh those costs against the benefits of international 
delegations.92  In fact, critics generally offer only passing reference 
to the potential benefits, if at all, of greater international 
cooperation.  But any analysis of the virtues of binding 
international delegations would have to consider both sides of the 
ledger—costs and benefits—in order to support any claim that the 
agency costs are sufficient to warrant restricting delegations.  
Rather than engaging in this analysis, the literature essentially 
provides a one-sided, agency cost-driven analysis. 
While it is beyond the scope of this Article to provide a 
comprehensive analysis of costs and benefits of international 
delegations, it is uncontroversial to suggest that there are global 
challenges that can only be addressed through international 
cooperation, and that international delegations may be one way to 
exploit the organizational advantages of centralized international 
institutions.  Some international issues have clear spillover effects 
that can be most effectively addressed on the international level.  
For example, the recent (and ongoing) world financial crisis 
                                                                                                                        
(demonstrating, for instance, that President Roosevelt played a vital role in the 
formation of the United Nations and even saw it as the crowning achievement of 
his political career). 
92 See Hathaway, supra note 83, at 116, 141 (encouraging scholars to consider 
the benefits of international delegations, not only the costs).  
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increased calls for greater harmonization of financial and economic 
regulation;93 the climate change threat has led to numerous 
attempts by the international community to expand the Kyoto 
Protocol94 and reduce carbon emissions;95 and the attacks of 
September 11 in the United States and bombings in the United 
Kingdom and Spain have resulted in greater cooperation in 
combating international terrorism, its funding, and organization.96  
This list is not nearly comprehensive, but it suggests that any 
                                                     
93 See, e.g., James G. Neuger, EU Pushes for More Global Finance Rules in 
Challenge to Obama, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 7, 2008, 8:27 AM), http://www.bloomberg. 
com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=a5gzUenHiqKM&refer=Europe 
(reporting that, in light of the 2008 credit crisis, “[t]he EU will seek more powers 
for the International Monetary Fund, call for stiffer regulation of credit-rating 
agencies and hedge funds, and urge a crackdown on risk-taking and bankers’ 
pay”; while the Danish prime minister called for “better international regulation 
of the capital markets, . . . more transparency, . . . common rules concerning 
control and supervision, [and] common rules concerning accounting standards”); 
see also Merkel Says Crisis Chance for Tough Financial Rules, REUTERS, (Dec. 30, 
2008, 11:26 PM), http://uk.reuters.com/article/2008/12/30/uk-germany-merkel-
idUKTRE4BT5IZ20081230 (“[German Chancellor Angela] Merkel, who has 
indirectly criticised the United States and Britain for thwarting earlier efforts to 
tighten controls and introduce more transparency, said she would press for 
international organizations to clamp down.”); David Lawder & Lisa Lambert, U.S. 
Must Lead World to Tougher Regulation: Summers, REUTERS, (Mar. 13, 2009, 5:48 
PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/03/13/us-financial-summers-idUST 
RE52C3UY20090313 (“Top White House economic adviser Lawrence Summers . . . 
called for the United States to lead a global effort to boost regulatory standards 
and warned against allowing regulators to compete with one other.”). 
94 Krittivas Mukherjee & Alister Doyle, World Leaders Try to Save Troubled 
Climate Talks, REUTERS (Dec. 16, 2009, 6:46 PM), http://in.reuters.com/article/ 
2009/12/16/idINIndia-44776420091216 (describing slow-going efforts to update 
and renew the climate regime, with governments attempting to negotiate “a deal 
to transform global economies by putting greater curbs on planet-warming 
greenhouse gas emissions, mainly from burning fossil fuels, from 2013 after 
Kyoto’s first phase ends”). 
95 Since the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
entered into force, parties to the agreement have met annually in Conferences of 
the Parties (COP) to discuss how to deal with climate change.  During the 1990s, 
the COP began to negotiate legal obligations for reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions.  Carbon emissions goals have been raised at numerous conferences 
including Copenhagen in 2009 and Durban in 2011.  See, e.g., Meetings: Durban 
Climate Change Conference—November/December 2011, UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK 
CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE http://unfccc.int/meetings/durban_nov_ 
2011/meeting/6245.php (last visited May 1, 2013). 
96 United Nations General Assembly Adopts Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, 
UNITED NATIONS ACTION TO COUNTER TERRORISM, http://www.un.org/en/ 
terrorism/strategy-counter-terrorism.shtml (last visited May 1, 2013). 
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determination of agency costs must be weighed against how the 
benefits of successful coordination on these issues, and many 
others, might redound to the United States. 
Similar to domestic agencies in the United States, international 
institutions can take advantage of the aggregation of human 
expertise, broader access to data, greater legitimacy, and the 
accumulation of institutional knowledge built up over time to 
address the issues of global concern.97  International institutions 
with standing committees, bodies, or executive structures can act 
more rapidly to address global issues as they occur, rather than 
wait for states to coordinate or to act independently in a crisis.  
These actions are mostly done at a lower cost through an 
international institution with decision-making authority rather 
than by state coordination on a bilateral or multilateral basis; on an 
issue-by-issue basis; or in a reactive, ad hoc manner.  Limits on the 
national government’s ability to delegate binding authority might 
make it harder for the United States to enjoy the gains of 
international cooperation in the situation where the gains might 
outweigh the potential agency costs. 
The general or long-term benefits for the United States to have 
the flexibility of delegating binding authority to international 
institutions—without procedural constraints—are more 
speculative, but important.  International relations scholars differ 
on the value of international institutions.98  Some think that 
                                                     
97 See generally Robert O. Keohane, Stephen Macedo & Andrew Moravcsik, 
Democracy-Enhancing Multilateralism, 63 INT’L ORG. 1 (2009) (arguing that 
multilateral institutions can enhance the quality of national democratic processes, 
even in well-functioning democracies). 
98 For example, social constructivism, democratic peace theory, and 
institutionalism all provide different understandings of the role of international 
institutions.  Social constructivists argue that transnational litigation promotes the 
internalization of international legal norms in the domestic setting and influences 
how governments conduct international relations.  See Harold Hongju Koh, 
Transnational Legal Process, 75 NEB. L. REV. 181, 199 (1996) (arguing that 
transnational litigation aids in the process where “international legal norms seep 
into, are internalized, and become entrenched in domestic legal and political 
processes”).  Democratic peace theory posits that regime type—liberal or 
nonliberal—determines a State’s compliance with international law.  See Anne-
Marie Slaughter, International Law in a World of Liberal States, 6 EUR. J. INT’L L. 503, 
528–34 (1995) (outlining the differences between liberal and non-liberal regimes in 
inter-governmental agreements).  Institutionalism argues that institutions reduce 
information asymmetries and uncertainty, and, as a result, facilitate cooperation 
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international institutions have an independent effect on state 
behavior and are therefore capable of shaping state interests,99 
while others find them as tools of the states that created them.100  In 
the absence of a clear answer on this issue, it is unwise to create 
national constitutional-design rules that limit the ability of the 
United States to delegate to international institutions and narrow 
the United States’ foreign affairs options. 
For example, one prominent theory suggests that after conflict, 
the United States has historically designed international 
institutions with the goal of locking-in an existing legal or 
“constitutional” order of international governance—one that 
reflects the economic, political, and national security interests of 
the United States—in advance of their inevitable decline in power 
relative to other states.101  By creating the rules of international 
politics when it is a hegemon, the United States is effectively 
“hedging” against future changes in the distribution of power in 
international politics.  For example, after World War II, the United 
States created the U.N., the International Monetary Fund (“IMF”), 
and the World Bank, presumably at the peak of its relative power 
with the hope that, as Europe and Asia were rebuilding in the mid-
twentieth century, they would enter an existing structure of 
international governance.  This structure would deter challenges to 
the U.S.-crafted political, economic, and military order. 
                                                                                                                        
among States.  See ROBERT O. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY: COOPERATION AND 
DISCORD IN THE WORLD POLITICAL ECONOMY 94 (1984). 
99 See, e.g., HEDLEY BULL, THE ANARCHICAL SOCIETY (1977); MARTHA 
FINNEMORE, NATIONAL INTERESTS IN INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY (1996); ALEXANDER 
WENDT, SOCIAL THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1999). 
100 See JOHN J. MEARSHEIMER, THE TRAGEDY OF GREAT POWER POLITICS (2001) 
(developing a theory of structural realism to explain state behavior and the 
pursuit of power among the most powerful states in the international system); 
HANS J. MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS: THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER AND 
PEACE (6th ed. 1985) (examining a realist approach to international law that 
analyzes foreign policy and international politics as being driven by interests in 
power); KENNETH N. WALTZ, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1979) 
(developing a balance of power theory of international relations that focuses on 
the structure of the international system). 
101 See generally G. JOHN IKENBERRY, AFTER VICTORY: INSTITUTIONS, STRATEGIC 
RESTRAINT, AND THE REBUILDING OF ORDER AFTER MAJOR WARS (2001) (arguing that 
the United States has tried to develop a constitutional post-war order through the 
use of international law and international organizations). 
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Now, with the rise of China, India, Brazil, and other 
developing countries, the United States’ incentives to hedge or 
lock-in the existing order, which it still dominates, might be 
stronger.  Though certainly speculative and contested, it is at least 
plausible that the United States could use international institutions 
as a tool to try to contain rising countries in a multilateral web of 
international governance, and maintain its influence on 
international politics, even as its economic and military power 
recede. If this proposition is accurate, then raising the costs of 
enacting international delegations might be counter-productive. 
The point of this discussion is not to endorse any long-term 
strategy to use international delegations and international 
institutions for United States foreign policy purposes.  Rather, it 
shows that the benefits of international delegations—both with 
respect to specific issues of global concern and broader U.S. foreign 
policy goals—might outweigh the agency costs associated with 
them.  At the very least, claims that high agency costs justify 
making binding international delegations more difficult requires a 
deeper evaluation of their potential benefits. 
4. TOOLS FROM DOMESTIC DELEGATIONS AVAILABLE FOR 
INTERNATIONAL DELEGATIONS 
This Article argues that many of the oversight tools for 
domestic delegations are available and used in the international 
context, a point frequently ignored by critics of international 
delegations.  What are the domestic tools?  And are they available 
and effective for the United States for international delegations?  
This Section outlines those tools and their international analogs.  
The analysis suggests that agency costs in international delegations 
may not be as high as critics assume and do not justify raising the 
enactment costs of such delegations.  It also outlines some of the 
oversight tools unique to the international environment. 
As discussed in Section 2, the ex ante domestic oversight 
mechanisms include the appointments process.  In this process, 
Congress and the President can designate loyal agency heads to 
ensure that the agency acts within their delegated authority.  Using 
procedural constraints on the agency can also achieve this goal, 
including requiring the use of specific decision-making 
methodologies or explicit agenda setting.  Still others focus on 
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institutional design to limit discretion and constrain the agencies, 
or requirements to use specific decision-making methodologies.  
After the agency begins exercising decision-making authority, 
Congress can use its appropriations power to limit the capacity of 
the agency to act, it can provide for greater judicial review of 
agency rule-making, and, perhaps most importantly, it can, in 
theory, set up committees to monitor agency activities through 
police patrols and fire alarms.  Finally, the President can narrow 
agency discretion through explicit directives, intra-executive 
supervision, and the assumption of responsibility for agency 
actions.  Though imperfect, these tools permit the principal to 
reduce agency slack and limit shirking and self-dealing by the 
agent. 
Many of these ex ante and ex post tools are present, in slightly 
different forms, in the international context. Of course, the 
argument here is not that the international oversight tools perfectly 
mimic those tools in the domestic context, making agency costs 
exactly the same.  Rather, the argument is that any claim that 
agency costs are sufficiently high to warrant constitutional redress 
fails without a closer examination of the various tools that the 
United States uses to influence international institutions.  
Understanding the full set of options available to mitigate agency 
costs also requires an examination of both ex ante and ex post tools, 
something that critics underplay in concluding that international 
delegations are problematic. 
Some might argue that even if agency costs in international 
delegations are high, the number of international delegations by 
states that include actual binding authority is small,102 ameliorating 
any concerns.  But this argument misses two key points.  First, it is 
clear that the most pressing problems of global concern require 
international cooperation.  It is also clear that states have turned to 
international institutions as the entity to aggregate information, 
facilitate decision-making, and implement solutions.  This 
expectation is the story of the late-twentieth and early-twenty-first 
                                                     
102 See Guzman & Landsidle, supra note 2, at 1695–96 (noting there are only 
two significant delegations of authority to international institutions by states—the 
United Nations Security Council and the European Union).  Though Guzman and 
Landsidle are correct that international delegations of the binding variety do not 
comprise the majority of delegations, the prospect of such delegations is likely to 
grow over time, making an analysis worthwhile. 
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centuries and, perhaps unsurprisingly, the United States has been 
the chief protagonist.  For better or worse, states are likely to 
continue to delegate authority to international institutions.  If this 
premise is correct, it is important to focus on the United States and 
the oversight mechanisms that might exist to reduce agency costs 
in international delegations.  This Article, in contrast to the extant 
critical literature on international delegations, looks to U.S. 
domestic delegations to better understand the monitoring and 
oversight tools available.  By engaging in this analysis, it is easier 
to evaluate the implications of international delegations for U.S. 
domestic law and the logic of constitutionally-inspired limitations. 
Second, as a practical matter, some international delegations 
might be important even if they are not binding.  For example, we 
can imagine logrolling within an international institution.  The 
United States might be willing to support initiatives that it does not 
like in exchange for support on issues that are particularly 
important.  And since international institutions reduce the 
transactions costs related to international cooperation, the United 
States will naturally accept some limits on its ability to act 
unilaterally on an issue in order to ensure that other states “buy-
in” to the broader structure of the international institution, one that 
over time and across the majority of issues generally reflects U.S. 
interests.  Even if the United States has substantial control of an 
international institution, one can still imagine situations in which 
the United States loses the battle on a specific initiative in order to 
win the war of keeping states committed to an organizational 
structure that the United States created.  Thus, the international 
delegation can have consequences for the United States, making a 
deeper understanding of the oversight tools a particularly 
important inquiry. 
Of course, it is hard to predict, ex ante, the specific structure of 
the international institution that would exercise binding decision-
making authority.103  It is thus difficult to make definitive claims 
                                                     
103  CURTIS A. BRADLEY & JACK L. GOLDSMITH, FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW 554-55 
(4th ed. 2011) (emphasizing, for instance, that the United States ratified the 
Chemical Weapons Convention subject to twenty-eight conditions, including the 
condition that the President has the power to refuse an inspection and that 
Congress has a right to make reservations).  See also Louis Henkin, U.S. Ratification 
of Human Rights Conventions: The Ghost of Senator Bricker, 89 AM. J. INT’L L. 341, 
346–48 (1995) (“The United States has been declaring the human rights 
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about the presence of high agency costs in binding international 
delegations or the need to limit them.  But we can get traction on 
these questions by looking at the current structure of international 
institutions to which the United States has delegated non-binding 
authority and draw inferences about the possible structure of 
institutions that might exercise binding authority.  If those 
international institutions exercising non-binding authority have 
internal structures that provide the United States with significant 
influence and control—and keep agency costs down—we can 
imagine how the United States would structure the international 
institutions to which it might delegate binding authority.  Since the 
stakes are higher in the latter context, the United States is even 
more likely to ensure that the international institution is 
accountable to American interests.  This becomes clear when 
viewing how the United States exercises its political, military, and 
economic influence to shape the design and internal operation of 
international institutions.  Broadly speaking, the United States has 
the unique capacity to influence the activities of international 
organizations and ensure greater accountability than the critics of 
international delegations generally assume.  The United States, for 
all intents and purposes, is the dominant principal in the world’s 
most important international institutions.  The list below describes 
a few of the tools available to the United States. 
4.1. Ex Ante Oversight Tools for International Delegations 
As you might imagine, the claims about the ability of the 
United States to use ex ante tools derives from theories of 
international relations and their predictions regarding 
international institutions: who creates the institutions, how they 
operate, and how they enforce their policies, rules or decisions.  
International institutions are generally conceived, designed and 
operated by powerful states to allow them to coordinate and 
                                                                                                                        
agreements it has ratified to be non-self-executing.”).  The International Labour 
Organization also issues nonbinding guidelines for labor standards in addition to 
conventions that may be ratified by member states.  Conventions and 
Recommendations, INT’L LABOUR ORG. (2012), http://www.ilo.org/global/ 
standards/introduction-to-international-labour-standards/conventions-and-
recommendations/lang--en/index.htm (last visited May 1, 2013). 
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achieve shared goals.104  At the same time, the international 
relations literature on rational constitutional design also generates 
hypotheses about structuring international institutions to meet 
certain goals, to increase flexibility, and even to shape state 
interests.105  If such options exist, the claim is less convincing that 
the difference in agency costs between international and domestic 
delegations, by itself, justifies disparate constitutional treatment.  
In the end, the capacity of the United States to influence the 
international institution will depend on the nature of the 
delegation; the decision-making procedures of the institution; the 
substantive area (pollution, chemical weapons, human rights); and 
the precision of the rule adopted106 (hard law or soft law).  The 
purpose of this discussion is to demonstrate that many of the 
oversight mechanisms in domestic delegations are also available to 
the United States in the international context.  So what are the tools 
that the United States, as the principal, can use to reduce agency 
slack? 
The most effective ex ante tools center on institutional design 
and procedures, namely agenda setting, attenuated delegation, 
voting rules (weighted voting and veto powers), appointments, 
and funding.  The United States has been the founder and key 
member of the most significant international institutions in the 
world today including the U.N.,107 the IMF, the World Bank, the 
                                                     
104 See KEOHANE, supra note 98 (discussing the importance of institutions as a 
means for reducing information asymmetries and uncertainty, while also helping 
facilitate cooperation among states); Robert O. Keohane & Lisa L. Martin, The 
Promise of Institutionalist Theory, 20 INT’L SEC. 39 (1995) (highlighting the 
importance of institutions as channels for achieving the benefits of sustained 
cooperation). 
105 See Barbara Koremenos, Charles Lipson & Duncan Snidal, The Rational 
Design of International Institutions, 55 INT’L ORG. 761, 762 (2001) (describing 
international institutions’ range of features as “the result of rational, purposive 
interactions among states and other international actors to solve specific 
problems”); Alexander Wendt, Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social 
Construction of Power Politics, 46 INT’L ORG. 391 (1992) (suggesting that state 
interests in anarchy are not fixed and could be shaped by norms, ideas and inter-
subjective understandings). 
106 See Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in International 
Governance, 54 INT’L ORG. 421, 448 (2000) (“[S]trong states must typically make the 
substantive content of legalized arrangements (just) attractive enough to 
encourage broad participation at an acceptable cost.”). 
107 Member States of the United Nations, UNITED NATIONS, http://www.un.org/ 
en/members/ (last visited May 1, 2013). 
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General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”), and the World 
Trade Organization,108 among others.  Given its prominence in 
world affairs, the United States has been able to design the 
international institution with its interests in mind, making the 
institutions more accountable to its wishes.  This Section provides 
examples of some of these ex ante tools in the operation of the U.N., 
the World Bank, the IMF, and the WTO.  It is not, by any means, a 
comprehensive discussion of all the mechanisms that the United 
States has at its disposal to monitor international institutions.  It 
also does not touch upon every single international entity to which 
the United States has delegated either binding or non-binding 
authority. 
Attenuated Delegation.  For many international institutions, the 
United States has created “majority rule” decision-making 
processes on some issues, while reserving the most important 
issues to smaller entities within the institution.  In essence, the 
United States has delegated general authority to the international 
institution, and, within the institution, it has ensured that specific 
authority has been delegated to or nested in a smaller sub-group 
that exercises true decision-making authority.  For example, the 
U.N. has some 192 members and each has a vote in the U.N. 
General Assembly.  But, for the most important issues regarding 
the “maintenance of international peace and security,”109 the U.N. 
is structured such that the U.N. General Assembly, in effect, 
delegates decision-making authority to the U.N. Security Council 
(“Security Council”).110  The Security Council has only fifteen 
members at any given time, five of which are permanent and 
possess a veto: the United States, France, Great Britain, China and 
Russia.111  With the veto power, the United States can block any 
potential Security Council resolution that conflicts with U.S. 
interests or those of its allies.  For the key security issues of 
international politics, the 192 members of the United Nations do 
                                                     
108 See Press Brief, World Trade Org., Fiftieth Anniversary of the Multilateral 
Trading System (Dec., 1996), available at http://www.wto.org/english/the 
wto_e/minist_e/min96_e/chrono.htm (last visited May 1, 2013) (listing the 
United States as a founding member of the GATT). 
109 U.N. Charter art. 24, ¶ 1. 
110 Id. arts. 10–12 (describing the functions and powers of the General 
Assembly). 
111 Id. arts. 23, 27 (defining the composition of the Security Council). 
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not have the bulk of the influence; it is really an institution of five.  
The agency costs, such as they are, will likely be reduced in this 
structure.  The World Bank and the IMF also have smaller 
subgroups that exercise true decision-making authority.  Though 
the World Bank has 187 member states,112 the real power remains 
with the twenty-five person executive board, five of which are 
nominated by the United States, Germany, France, Japan and the 
United Kingdom, and with the President of the World Bank, who 
has always been an American.113  The IMF also has 187 member 
states, but real power for major decisions is lodged with the 
twenty-four directors on the executive board, with five of the 
directors representing the same five countries listed above.114  Even 
this superficial overview of the decision-making structure of the 
IMF and the World Bank suggests that the United States has 
structured both institutions to try to ensure American control and, 
as a consequence, reduce agency costs.  Just as in the domestic 
context, the United States has tools to monitor and oversee 
international institutions. 
Voting Rules.  The United States’ outsize influence through 
attenuated delegations in the U.N., the IMF, and WTO is 
exacerbated by their voting rules.  Most international institutions 
are not democratic in their voting procedures and reflect a 
disproportionate influence for the United States well beyond the 
size of its population.115  For example, the United States has a veto 
                                                     
112 About Us: Member Countries, THE WORLD BANK, http://go.worldbank.org/ 
SGCDPJKLX0 (last updated Jan. 19, 2012). 
113 About Us: Boards of Directors, THE WORLD BANK, http://go.worldbank.org/ 
LHHOT1LSW0 (last updated May 19, 2013); Robert K. Fleck & Christopher Kilby, 
World Bank Independence: A Model and Statistical Analysis of US Influence, 10 REV. OF 
DEV. ECON. 224, 224 (2006) (noting the “traditional nomination of World Bank 
Presidents by the US”). 
114 Membership, INT’L MONETARY FUND, http://www.imf.org/external/ 
about/members.htm (last visited May 1, 2013); IMF Executive Directors and Voting 
Power, INT’L MONETARY FUND, http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/memdir/ 
eds.aspx (May 1, 2013).  See also MILES KAHLER, LEADERSHIP SELECTION IN THE 
MAJOR MULTILATERALS, at viii (2001) (“For the [International Financial 
Institutions], the United States and Europe have laid exclusive claims to 
leadership positions since the formation of the institutions.”). 
115 See Fleck & Kilby, supra note 113 (“The US is the most influential member 
of the World Bank . . . .”); see also Axel Dreher & Nathan M. Jensen, Independent 
Actor or Agent? An Empirical Analysis of the Impact of U.S. Interests on International 
Monetary Fund Conditions, 50 J.L. & ECON. 105, 106–07 (2007) (describing the United 
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and permanent seat on the Security Council;116 though the United 
States cannot force resolutions through the Security Council due to 
the presence of other veto powers, it can prevent the Security 
Council from acting contrary to U.S. interests.  At the IMF, the 
United States has a nearly seventeen percent weighted vote at an 
institution that requires a consensus of eighty-five percent for 
major decisions and amendments,117 and virtually the same 
structure exists at the World Bank.  In fact, the biggest criticism of 
both the World Bank and the IMF is the effective veto that the 
United States has over any major decisions.118  Studies in the 
political science literature on the IMF and the World Bank find 
that, overall, they have been effective agents for the interests of 
their principal, the United States.119  If anything, these international 
institutions are actually uniquely responsive to U.S. interests rather 
than unaccountable to the American public. 
                                                                                                                        
States’ power within the IMF and its ability to veto any decision based on its 
voting share). 
116 U.N. Charter arts. 23 and 27. 
117 See INT’L MONETARY FUND, ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL 
MONETARY FUND (1944) (requiring an eighty-five percent majority vote for all 
major decisions); IMF Members’ Quotas and Voting Power, and IMF Board of 
Governors, INT’L MONETARY FUND, http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/mem 
dir/members.aspx#U (last updated July 7, 2013) (listing quotas and voting shares 
for the United States and other IMF Members).  
118 See NGAIRE WOODS, THE GLOBALIZERS: THE IMF, THE WORLD BANK, AND 
THEIR BORROWERS 27–28 (2006) (emphasizing the process of increasing influence 
that the most powerful states, and the United States in particular, have exercised 
on the IMF and the World Bank); Daniel L. Nielson & Michael J. Tierney, 
Delegation to International Organizations: Agency Theory and World Bank 
Environmental Reform, 57 INT’L ORG. 241, 242, 254–56 (2003) (describing the intense 
influence that the United States can impose on the World Bank when Congress 
and the President have converging policies). 
119 See Dreher & Jensen, supra note 115 (describing the United States’ 
influence within the IMF); Fleck & Kilby, supra note 113 (describing the United 
States as the most influential member of the World Bank); Thomas Oatley & Jason 
Yackee, American Interests and IMF Lending, 41 INT’L POL. 415 (2004) (describing 
how American policymakers influence the IMF to pursue their financial and 
foreign policy objectives); Thomas Barnebeck et al., US Politics and World Bank 
IDA-Lending, 42 J. DEV. STUD. 772 (2006) (concluding the United States exerted 
significant influence on International Development Association lending during 
the 1990s based on issues identified as important by the State Department). 
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Though much of the literature on the WTO focuses on its 
dispute resolution mechanism,120 the WTO’s consensus decision-
making structure ensures that the developed countries, including 
the United States, have disproportionate influence over outcomes.  
Although each member state has a vote, virtually all decisions by 
the WTO are taken by consensus, meaning “if no member present at 
the meeting when the decision is formally taken, formally objects to 
the proposed decisions.”121  As a consequence, the ability of the 
WTO’s member states—and their respective delegates—to attend 
and participate in meetings is of particular importance in shaping 
the agenda, negotiations, and decision-making at the WTO.122 
But, unsurprisingly, developing countries do not have the staff 
or resources to follow and actively participate in the WTO’s 
decision-making.  Each year, the WTO General Council meets as 
many as six times,123 discussing multiple issue areas ranging from 
the effect of non-tariff measures on small economies to trade 
finance reform.  While the developed countries have the resources 
to participate—the United States, Japan, and Germany, for 
example, have forty-seven124 delegates working full time at the 
WTO—some forty-five countries have fewer than three.125  
                                                     
120 See, e.g., Judith Hippler Bello, The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding: 
Less Is More, 90 AM. J. INT’L L. 416 (1996); Gabrielle Marceau, WTO Dispute 
Settlement and Human Rights, 13 EURO. J. INT’L L. 753 (2002); Marc L. Busch & Eric 
Reinhardt, Three’s a Crowd: Third Parties and WTO Dispute Settlement, 68 WORLD 
POL. 446 (2006). 
121 Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 50, art. IX, n.1 (emphasis added). 
122 For example, the WTO has a small Secretariat, with approximately six 
hundred official staff, that runs the day-to-day operations for the institution.  See 
The WTO: Secretariat and Budget: Overview of the WTO Secretariat, WORLD TRADE 
ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/secre_e/intro_e.htm (last visited 
May 1, 2013).  This might seem large, but it is dwarfed by the World Bank’s ten 
thousand official staff or even the IMF’s twenty-four hundred official staff.  About 
Us: People, THE WORLD BANK, http://go.worldbank.org/B6U4HPNDS0 (last 
updated June 29, 2012); Staff of International Civil Servants, INT’L MONETARY FUND, 
http://www.imf.org/external/about/staff.htm (last visited May 1, 2013). 
123 The WTO General Council is scheduled to meet six times in 2013.  WTO 
General Council, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/ 
gcounc_e/gcounc_e.htm (last visited May 1, 2013). 
124 Carolyn Deere, Changing the Power Balance at the WTO: Is the Capacity-
Building Agenda Helping 32 (United Nations Dev. Programme Human Dev. Report 
Office Occasional Paper No. 2005/5, 2005), available at http://hdr.undp.org/en/ 
reports/global/hdr2005/papers/HDR2005_Carolyn_Deere_5.pdf. 
125 Id. at 32–34. 
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Moreover, some of these delegates from developing countries are 
not only tasked with responsibility at the WTO’s headquarters in 
Geneva but also represent their respective states at the half dozen 
other international institutions located in the city.126  In effect, it is 
hard for developing countries to participate in the WTO’s decision-
making structure, while easier for wealthier, developed countries 
like the United States to influence outcomes.  Again, the WTO 
shrinks from an international institution with 153 member states to 
one in which a small number of states exercises real power.127 
Appointments.  The United States also has influence over the 
appointment and termination of top officials at many international 
institutions.128  In agency-cost terms, the United States has tried to 
ensure that agency heads are not too far removed from American 
interests.  One unobservable way in which the United States 
influences international institutions is by shaping the decision-
making of other states.  If a state knows that the United States is 
likely to look unfavorably on a potential nominee, that state will be 
less willing to nominate the person in the first place.  U.S. 
preferences frame the breadth of decision-making options for other 
states.  But there are observable factors as well.  The United States 
single-handedly blocked the re-appointment of Boutros Boutros-
Ghali as U.N. Secretary General in 1996,129 by exercising its veto 
power on the Security Council despite losing the Security Council 
vote 1-14.130  In casting this vote, Secretary of State Madeleine 
Albright stated that the United States was dissatisfied with his 
                                                     
126 Id. at 10. 
127 Of course, many might question this analysis given the difficulties that the 
United States and other developed countries have had in moving forward on the 
Doha Round of negotiations.  But the argument in this Article is that the United 
States can influence the operation of international institutions to ensure that they 
will not act contrary to U.S. interests, while still allowing the United States to 
pursue its own initiatives. 
128 See Robert Hunter Wade, Hegemony and the World Bank: The Fight over 
People and Ideas, 9 REV. INT’L POL. ECO. 201, 217–18 (2002) (describing how the 
United States used its influence over the composition of World Bank leadership); 
cf. KAHLER, supra note 114. 
129 Security Council Unanimously Chooses Annan as New Leader, THE NEWS (Boca 
Raton), Dec. 14, 1996, http://news.google.co.uk/newspapers? id=rDRUAAAAIB 
AJ&sjid=nY4DAAAAIBAJ&pg=5835%2C3781302; U.S. Blocks Re-Appointment of 
Boutros-Ghali as U.N. Secretary-General; Kofi Annan Elected as Successor, 8 FOREIGN 
POL’Y BULL. 104 (Feb. 1, 1997). 
130 Security Council Unanimously Chooses Annan as New Leader, supra note 129. 
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leadership and wanted a new direction at the U.N., regardless of 
the level of his support in the international community.131  When 
the Security Council authorizes the use of force, the United States 
also insists that all American troops acting on behalf of the U.N. 
only serve under an American commander, even though the 
United States is formally acting under U.N. auspices.132  At the 
World Bank, the United States not only has an effective veto power 
over major decisions but also unilaterally names the President of 
the World Bank,133 inevitably an American who will likely shape 
the direction of the international institution to pursue U.S. 
interests. 
Even this simple discussion of four of the world’s most 
prominent international institutions demonstrates that the United 
States implemented many ex ante tools to try to ensure that the 
international institutions to which it has delegated non-binding 
authority remain effective agents for their principal—the United 
States.  But this is not the limit of the United States’ capacity to 
influence international institutions and reduce agency costs; just as 
within the domestic delegations context, the United States has 
several ex post tools as well. 
4.2. Ex Post Oversight Tools for International Delegations 
The United States’ predominance in international politics also 
allows it to use a set of ex post tools that are conceptually similar to 
those available in the domestic context.  They range from funding 
international institutions, side payments to states, and conditions 
on foreign aid, to provisional participation, withdrawal, and the 
                                                     
131 Discussing the United States’ veto on Boutros-Ghali’s reelection, 
Madeleine Albright stated “[w]e believe that the United Nations needs new 
leadership for the 21st century, somebody whos [sic] going to get up every 
morning and decide that reforming the U.N. so that it can function in the 21st 
century is his or her major goal.”  U.S. Poised to Veto Boutros-Ghali, 
CNNINTERACTIVE (Nov. 17, 1996, 10:45 PM), http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/ 
9611/17/ghali/. 
132 See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, PUB. NO. 10161, THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION’S 
POLICY ON REFORMING MULTILATERAL PEACE OPERATIONS (1994), available at 
http://clinton4.nara.gov/textonly/WH/EOP/NSC/html/documents/NSCDoc1.
html (noting that while the President “will never relinquish command of U.S. 
forces,” he retains the authority to place forces under operational control of a 
foreign commander). 
133 Fleck & Kilby, supra note 113. 
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creation of new international institutions.  While these ex post tools 
might be more costly for the United States—withdrawal from an 
international institution or the creation of a new one is not easy—
they are available to the United States, and on occasion it has 
utilized them.  But, if the United States’ participation in any 
international institution is key for that institution’s efficacy, the 
very availability of these tools and the prospect of their use also 
shape the operation of international institutions and keeps them 
generally aligned with U.S. interests.  The United States does not 
have to exercise its power in order to influence state behavior. 
Funding.134  Perhaps most obvious, just like Congress can 
threaten or formally limit the agency budget, designate the funding 
for specific purposes, and condition increases on the achievement 
of certain goals, the United States can do similarly with some 
international institutions.135  This tool is uniquely available to the 
United States because it is often the single biggest financial 
supporter of international institutions.136  The United States is the 
largest contributor to the IMF and World Bank,137 and it 
contributes almost twenty-two percent of the U.N.’s operating 
                                                     
134 Ian A. Bowles & Cyril F. Komos, Environmental Reform at the World Bank: 
The Role of the U.S. Congress, 35 VA. J. INT’L L. 777, 782 (1995) (noting that in the 
context of multilateral development banks, “Congress is free to determine the 
amount of funding it provides for any given program, to set conditions for 
disbursement or even to earmark part of its contribution”). 
135 The Clinton administration, for instance, conditioned World Bank funding 
on specific reforms, including the creation of an inspection panel and the 
restructuring of the World Bank’s Global Environment Facility.  Ian A. Bowles & 
Cyril F. Komos, The American Campaign for Environmental Reforms at the World 
Bank, 23 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 211, 220 (1999).  The United States has also 
withheld contributions from the Inter-American Development Bank until the 
institution required all borrowers to stop discriminating against procurement bids 
from potential suppliers in the United States and other countries.  JONATHAN E. 
SANFORD, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS20791, MULTILATERAL DEVELOPMENT BANKS: 
PROCEDURES FOR U.S. PARTICIPATION 3 (2001). 
136 In 2011, the United States contributed more than $580 million, or twenty-
two percent of the U.N. budget.  U.N. Secretariat, Assessment of Member States’ 
Contributions to the United Nations Regular Budget for the Year 2011, U.N. Doc. 
ST/ADM/SER.B/824 (Dec. 28, 2010).  Although the United States does not 
contribute money to the IMF every year, it remains the largest contributor to the 
IMF with a SDR quota of 42,122.4 million or more than seventeen percent of the 
Fund’s total.  JONATHAN E. SANFORD, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS20413, IMF AND 
WORLD BANK: U.S. CONTRIBUTIONS AND AGENCY BUDGETS 1 (1999); IMF Members’ 
Quotas and Voting Power, and IMF Board of Governors, supra note 117. 
137 SANFORD, supra note 136. 
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budget.  In fact, in the 1990s, the United States successfully 
conditioned payment of its outstanding dues to the U.N. on 
changes to the U.N.’s institutional structure to address corruption 
concerns and to increase transparency.138  Further, when the 
Security Council authorizes a use of force, it relies on the 
contribution of the member states for enforcement.139  The United 
States is by some distance the largest supplier of troops, funding, 
and materiel to U.N. “coalition” forces.  For example, when the 
Security Council authorized the use of force to remove Iraqi troops 
from Kuwait in 1991,140 the U.N. turned to the United States and 
other countries for support.  Unsurprisingly, the United States led 
the coalition and contributed the vast majority of troops and 
materiel to the effort.141  Even during the recent Security Council-
sanctioned campaign in Libya,142 the United States had to supply 
the bulk of munitions and intelligence because France and other 
countries were running out of resources.143 
                                                     
138 MARJORIE ANN BROWNE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33611, UNITED NATIONS 
SYSTEM FUNDING: CONGRESSIONAL ISSUES 43 (2011); Margaret P. Karns & Karen A. 
Mingst, The United States as “Deadbeat”? U.S Policy and the UN Financial Crisis, in 
MULTILATERALISM AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY: AMBIVALENT ENGAGEMENT 267, 275 
(Stewart Patrick & Shepard Forman eds., 2002). 
139 See Edward C. Luck, Tackling Terrorism, in THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL: 
FROM THE COLD WAR TO THE 21ST CENTURY 85, 97 (David M. Malone ed., 2004) 
(noting the U.N. Security Council’s “reliance on powerful member states for 
military enforcement”); see, e.g., S.C. Res. 743, U.N. Doc. S/RES/743 (Feb. 21, 1992) 
(authorizing the creation of the U.N. Protection Force). 
140 S.C. Res. 678, U.N. Doc. S/RES/678 (Nov. 29, 1990) (authorizing the use of 
“all necessary means” against Iraq beginning January 16, 1991, and requesting the 
States to provide support). 
141 The United States contributed more than five hundred thousand troops 
against Iraq during Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm—more than four 
times the amount of the next nation.  The United States also provided more than 
three thousand tanks and planes.  Daniel S. Papp, The Gulf War Coalition: The 
Politics and Economics of a Most Unusual Alliance, in THE EAGLE IN THE DESERT: 
LOOKING BACK ON U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN THE PERSIAN GULF WAR 21, 22 (William 
Head & Earl H. Tilford, Jr. eds., 1996). 
142 S.C. Res. 1973, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1973 (Mar. 17, 2011) (authorizing the use 
of “all necessary means” to protect Libyan civilians and serving as the basis for 
military intervention). 
143 See Borzou Daragahi & Brian Bennett, Libya Bombing Campaign Targets 
Kadafi’s Air, Ground Forces, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 21, 2011, http://articles.latimes. 
com/2011/mar/21/world/la-fg-libya-fighting-20110321 (“One problem the 
administration faces is that even though Obama wants the U.S. to play a 
supporting role in Libya—and, indeed, the first strike came from a French fighter 
jet—only the United States has the resources to launch the complex operations to 
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Side Payments and Foreign Aid.144  Similarly, the United States 
uses side-payments and attaches conditions on foreign aid to 
influence (or lobby) states to support U.S. initiatives both within 
and outside of international institutions.  We can imagine the 
United States using economic influence—some observable, some 
unobservable—to secure support for U.S. initiatives within 
international institutions or circumvent them.  At the U.N., after it 
became clear that the Security Council would not provide a 
resolution authorizing the use of force for the Second Gulf War, 
President George W. Bush created a “coalition of the willing”145 
that included states which received cash or in-kind payments in 
exchange for supporting the United States.146  When the United 
                                                                                                                        
clear Kadafi’s air defenses.”); James Kirkup et al., Libya: US Urged to Return to 
Front Line, TELEGRAPH (U.K.), Apr. 13, 2011, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/ 
worldnews/africaandindianocean/libya/8449063/Libya-US-urged-to-return-to-
front-line.html (reporting on France’s suggestion that the United States should 
deploy its resources in the Libya operations again); Meera Selva & Danica Kirka, 
Europe’s Libya Campaign Comes Under Scrutiny, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE, June 14, 
2011, http://www.utsandiego.com/news/2011/jun/14/europes-libya-campaign-
comes-under-scrutiny/ (reporting that France and Britain have been struggling 
with a lack of munitions and equipment). 
144 Side payments have long been used as a means of procuring cooperation 
with U.S. international policy goals.  In 1911, the United States made side 
payments to both Great Britain and Japan to seal the 1911 North Pacific Fur Seal 
Treaty.  SCOTT BARRETT, ENVIRONMENT AND STATECRAFT: THE STRATEGY OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL TREATY-MAKING 34 (2003).  More recently, the United States 
supplied North Korea with fuel oil and constructed two light-water reactors for 
North Korea’s continued participation in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.  
Alan Riding, U.S. and North Korea Sign Pact to End Nuclear Dispute, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 
22, 1994, http://www.nytimes.com/1994/10/22/world/us-and-north-korea-
sign-pact-to-end-nuclear-dispute.html.  Cf. Royal C. Gardner, Exporting American 
Values: Tenth Amendment Principles and International Environmental Assistance, 22 
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 34 (1998) (discussing the incentives provided to China and 
India to accede to the Montreal Protocol including a provision creating a fund for 
grants and concessional loans to developing nations to enable their compliance). 
145 Hamada Zahawi, Comment, Redefining the Laws of Occupation in the Wake 
of Operation Iraqi “Freedom,” 95 CALIF. L. REV. 2295, 2296 (2007) (“On March 19, 
2003 President George W. Bush proclaimed, ‘My fellow citizens, at this hour, 
American and coalition forces are in the early stages of military operations to 
disarm Iraq, to free its people and to defend the world from grave danger.’  With 
those words the United States and its ‘Coalition of the Willing’ launched 
Operation Iraqi Freedom.”) (footnotes omitted). 
146 Laura McClure, Coalition of the Billing—Or Unwilling?, SALON (Mar. 12, 
2003, 7:43 PM), http://www.salon.com/2003/03/12/foreign_aid/ (reporting the 
use of payments to build a coalition of approximately 40 nations to back the Iraq 
war effort). 
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States expressed concern that the International Criminal Court 
(“ICC”) might gain custody over Americans abroad, the United 
States conditioned the receipt of foreign aid to some countries on 
their willingness to refuse to turn over Americans to the ICC.147  
Moreover, since the United States has a substantial role in 
determining which states receive World Bank loans and IMF 
support, the United States has encouraged the attachment of many 
conditions on aid, forcing the recipients—who often cannot access 
private capital markets—to liberalize their economies, to cut the 
public sector, and to pass austerity packages.148  Many have 
criticized the conditions attached to aid as the United States 
imposing its policy preferences under duress.149  The takeaway is 
that the United States has tools to influence the product of 
international institutions by shaping the preferences of the member 
states. 
Create New Institutions.  Another tool that the United States has 
used to maintain influence over international institutions is simply 
creating a new institution when, for whatever reason, the old 
institution has been ineffective or unresponsive to U.S. interests.  
For example, in the negotiations to form the WTO, the United 
States and other large economic powers withdrew from the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”) and forced the 
developing countries to either join the new WTO in a single 
undertaking or remain outside the new international trade 
system.150  The United States and others forced the developing 
                                                     
147 See JENNIFER K. ELSEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31495, U.S. POLICY 
REGARDING THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 17 (2006) (describing the U.S. 
laws prohibiting Economic Support Funds from being paid to any party to the 
ICC that has not agreed to protect U.S. citizens from being turned over to the 
ICC); Jack L. Goldsmith, The Self-Defeating International Criminal Court, 70 U. CHI L. 
REV. 83 (2003). 
148 See Kim Lane Scheppele, A Realpolitik Defense of Social Rights, 82 TEX. L. 
REV. 1921, 1939–49 (“With the IMF able to walk away from the table without 
injury, while a country on the other side of the talks faces ruin, it is not surprising 
that countries in debt typically agree to IMF conditionalities.”).  Scheppele notes 
the typical conditions included monetary discipline, fiscal discipline, and 
privatization of state property.  Id. at 1940 (citing JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, 
GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 55 (2002)). 
149 See Dreher & Jensen, supra note 115 (surveying criticisms of the IMF as an 
“agent of U.S. foreign policy”). 
150 See Richard L. Steinberg, In the Shadow of Law or Power? Consensus-Based 
Bargaining and Outcomes in the GATT/WTO, 56 INT’L ORG. 339 (2002).  Judith H. 
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countries to join on their terms or lose access to the world’s largest 
economic markets.  Of course, creating a new institution is costly 
and requires participation from other states with similar interests, 
but it remains available depending on the degree to which the old 
international institution deviates from U.S. interests. 
Withdrawal.  The United States can refuse to join international 
institutions, withdraw, or only provisionally participate in 
international institutions that have acted or are likely to act 
consistently against U.S. interests.  For example, the United States 
refused to join the League of Nations in the early-twentieth 
century, likely condemning it to failure at its inception.  More 
recently, the United States signed but eventually indicated its 
intent not to become a party to the Rome Statute creating the 
International Criminal Court.151  Since the United States was 
particularly concerned with the ICC’s potential to create liability 
for both parties and non-parties to the treaty, the United States 
simply passed domestic legislation152 and signed Article 98 
Agreements with states parties to the ICC to ensure that Americans 
would not fall under its jurisdiction.153  In 2005, after the 
International Court of Justice decision in Avena, the United States 
withdrew from the Optional Protocol of the Vienna Convention on 
Consular Relations,154 which provided that the ICJ would have 
                                                                                                                        
Goldstein and Richard L. Steinberg also show that WTO judicial law-making 
matters only when powerful states adhere to judicial decisions and that 
compliance with liberalization decisions is in the U.S. interest.  See Goldstein & 
Steinberg, supra note 81, at 257. 
151 Statement of Bill Clinton, President of the United States, Authorizing the 
U.S. Signing of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Dec. 31, 
2000, available at http://www.iccnow.org/documents/USClintonSigning31Dec00. 
pdf (stating the U.S. signature on the Rome Statute is necessary to influence the 
evolution of the court, but that he will not submit the treaty to the Senate until 
U.S. concerns are addressed). 
152 See ELSEA, supra note 147. 
153 Id. 
154 Adam Liptak, The U.S. Says It Has Withdrawn from World Judicial Body, N.Y. 
TIMES, March 10, 2005, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/03/10/politics/10death. 
html.  According to then-State Department spokeswoman, Darla Jordan, the 
reason for withdrawal was to protect the United States “against future 
International Court of Justice judgment that might similarly interfere in ways [the 
United States] did not anticipate when [it] joined the optional protocol.” Id. 
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jurisdiction for claims under the Convention.155  Even earlier, in 
1984, the United States withdrew from the compulsory jurisdiction 
of the ICJ during the Nicaragua case156 and refused to participate in 
the ICJ’s proceedings. 
Though the discussion does not cover all the mechanisms 
available to the United States, it demonstrates that the United 
States has substantial tools to affect the conduct of international 
institutions by influencing the organization’s procedural rules, the 
composition of the rule-making body, and the agenda of the 
relevant decision-makers.  The United States can engage in both 
intra-institution and inter-institution logrolling, shift decision-
making authority across multiple organizational bodies,157 or 
create narrow or issue-specific organizations158 to make 
organizations more responsive to U.S. interests.  Agency costs exist 
in both domestic and international delegations but, given the 
United States’ oversight mechanisms, those costs might not differ 
significantly. 
4.3. Acts and Omissions of International Institutions 
By now it is clear that the United States has ex ante and ex post 
mechanisms to influence the operations of international 
institutions and ensure that they remain accountable to American 
interests.  Depending on the structure of the international 
institution, the relevant issue, and the interests of the other states, 
the United States will likely choose the mechanism that is most 
likely to generate the preferred outcome.  For reasons related to the 
United States’ power advantage, the United States has a broader 
                                                     
155 Optional Protocol Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes, art 
1, Apr. 18, 1964, 500 U.N.T.S. 241. 
156 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. 
U.S.), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment, 1984 I.C.J. 392, 398 (Nov. 26); see 
also John Quigley, The United States’ Withdrawal from International Court of Justice 
Jurisdiction in Consular Cases: Reasons and Consequences, 19 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 
263, 290–91 (2009). 
157 Eyal Benvenisti & George W. Downs, The Empire’s New Clothes: Political 
Economy and the Fragmentation of International Law, 60 STAN. L. REV. 595, 596 (2007) 
(noting “the increased proliferation of international regulatory institutions with 
overlapping jurisdictions and ambiguous boundaries”). 
158 See id. at 597. 
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set of tools to shape the final work product of the international 
institution. 
But the United States’ asymmetric power advantage does not 
mean that it can influence international institutions in all 
situations; rather, the United States can stop initiatives that it does 
not like, but it cannot always push through institutional objectives 
that it prefers.  For example, the United States’ veto on the Security 
Council means the United States can stop the Security Council 
from acting contrary to U.S. interests, but it doesn’t mean that the 
United States can always force the U.N. to act consistently with 
U.S. preferences.  Of course, the United States has other tools to 
encourage other states to align themselves with U.S. preferences—
some of those tools were outlined above—but the United States 
cannot guarantee that the international institution will always act 
in certain way.  On balance, the United States can often get what it 
wants out of an international institution, and can almost always 
block initiatives that it dislikes. 
Why is this important?  The dynamic described above suggests 
that the international institutions have a status-quo bias, one that 
favors the state or states that have designed, funded, and retained 
operational control of international institutions—in most instances, 
the United States.  Since the international institutions generally 
cannot act without U.S. consent, they cannot hurt the United States; 
in principal-agent terms, the agent cannot act without the 
principal’s approval.  The key point is that there is no 
accountability issue with international institutions since the United 
States can block the initiatives it opposes and generally push 
through those that it supports.  Thus, the acts and omissions of 
international institutions are unlikely to generate the kind of 
agency costs that warrant a formal limit on international 
delegations. 
4.4. The Future of International Delegations 
Finally, the argument outlined here focuses on the United 
States’ asymmetric power advantage in creating international 
institutions and ensuring some operational control through ex ante 
and ex post mechanisms.  But the United States will not maintain 
this power forever, and, sooner or later, its influence over 
international institutions will begin to wane.  Does this potential 
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eventuality support the critics’ contention that delegations create 
high agency costs? 
The answer to this question requires consideration of the 
international political environment in which the United States 
operates.  If the United States is the dominant power in 
international politics, the mechanisms outlined above will allow 
the United States to maintain effective control over international 
institutions, sharply reducing agency costs and accountability 
issues.  This suggests that, at least while the United States is 
dominant, international delegations to international institutions do 
not present serious problems.  However, if the United States is only 
one of two or three dominant countries in the world (with China, 
Brazil, and Germany rising), then the United States’ ability to 
control the international institution diminishes, creating greater 
accountability concerns.  In such an international environment, 
international delegations become more problematic and they will 
likely present more significant principal-agent concerns.  Thus, the 
ability of the United States to influence international institutions—
and the wisdom of international delegations—is a function of the 
level of constraint on the United States.159 
Even in a world in which the United States is no longer 
dominant, it is unclear why limits on international delegations are 
necessary when Congress and the President will be able to assess 
the United States’ ability to influence an international institution 
before delegating decision-making authority.  Congress and the 
President are well placed to analyze the costs and benefits of a 
specific delegation to an international institution, and, given the 
possibility that the international institution might make decisions 
inconsistent with U.S. interests, Congress and the President will 
likely be sensitive to the consequences of international delegations 
for the American people.  In other words, Congress and the 
President are already fully incentivized to internalize the costs of 
international delegations and to ensure that the international 
institutions with delegated authority are accountable to U.S. 
interests. 
                                                     
159 For a discussion of the role of international constraints on the President’s 
foreign affairs authority, see Daniel Abebe, The Global Determinants of U.S. Foreign 
Affairs Law, 49 STAN. J. INT’L L. 1 (2013). 
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5. CONCLUSION 
This Article’s central claim is that similar accountability issues 
are present in both domestic and international delegations, and 
that a similar range of oversight tools is available to the United 
States.  If agency costs are comparable, we can better assess 
arguments in favor of creating supermajority requirements, 
requiring a clear statement rule, or endorsing additional political 
branch authorization for international delegations. 
These arguments rest on the mistaken presumption that agency 
costs are high in the international delegations, and, as a result, ex 
ante constraints are necessary to ensure accountability.  But, as this 
Article has demonstrated, such constraints are unnecessary.  In 
fact, given the steps that the United States has taken to ensure the 
accountability in non-binding international delegations, it is likely 
that Congress and the President are already cognizant of the 
potential costs and benefits of international delegations when they 
provide their joint consent through the Article II process for 
treaties or through the Article I general law-making procedures for 
congressional-executive agreements.  It is unlikely that the political 
branches would need a clear statement requirement or a default of 
non-self-execution to force them to internalize the costs of 
delegating binding authority to an international institution; the 
political branches are well aware of the costs and benefits of 
international delegations.  Congress and the President’s use of 
reservations, understandings, and declarations (“RUDs”) in the 
treaty context, for example, demonstrate that awareness.  Again, 
given the United States’ role in the conception, design, and 
operation of many of the world’s most important international 
organizations, it is hard to imagine the United States delegating 
binding authority to an international institution that would act 
consistently against American interests or impose net costs on the 
United States.  
International delegations are in many ways substantially 
similar to domestic delegations.  They both generate agency costs, 
and, in each context, the United States, acting through Congress 
and the President, has similar oversight mechanisms to reduce 
them.  The specific agency costs in any single international 
delegations are likely to rest on myriad context-sensitive factors 
that make a general assessment difficult.  But what is clear is that 
proposals in support of limits on binding international delegations 
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require greater clarity on the measures of agency costs, the efficacy 
of oversight mechanisms, and the assumptions about the operation 
of international institutions.  Given the prominence of international 
governance in the American political discourse, Congress and the 
President are fully incentivized to consider carefully the wisdom of 
both binding and non-binding international delegations; national 
constitutional design limits are unnecessary. 
 
